





PREFACE

As Simon Kuznets argued, “the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income,” GDP-centred economic indicators cannot fully capture the complex dimensions of social progress. In response to this limitation, the focus of measurements has shifted beyond quantitative economic growth towards improving individuals’ life satisfaction and happiness. The importance of measuring quality of life for evidence-based policymaking has become increasingly recognised worldwide.

In response to this shift, the Data and Statistics Research Institute began developing the “Quality of Life Indicators in Korea” in 2011 and has published the indicator results and related data on its website since 2014.

“Quality of Life Indicators in Korea 2025” is the eighth report since the first edition was published in 2017. This report presents the results of measuring quality of life across three main areas—individuals, social relationships, and environmental conditions—divided into 11 specific domains. The findings are presented in an accessible manner so that all readers can easily understand the information. Based on data available as of December 2025, this report provides a clear overview of the current state and trends of quality of life in Korea through a comparison of the recent trends and time-series data for the 71 indicators in the 11 domains.

The results from the 2024–2025 quality of life measurement show indicators, such as leisure satisfaction and average monthly wage, included in the Leisure, Employment-Wage, and Income-Consumption-Wealth domains have improved overall. Meanwhile, many indicators deteriorated in the Family-Community, Health, and Safety domains. These results suggest that, despite improvements in individual quality of life, community bonds—an important foundation for quality of life—have weakened somewhat, potentially increasing exposure to social risks.

This year’s report includes two analysis papers (available only in Korean), *Quality of Life and Typology of Depopulation Areas Based on Subjective Indicators* and *Finding the True Value of Happiness: Implications of an Experimental Survey*. These papers provide useful insights into quality of life in depopulation areas and the accurate measurement of quality of life. We would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Daeun Kwon of Korea Social Science Data Archive and Dr. Sungah Kim of the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs for their valuable contributions to this report.

We hope that this report will serve as a useful resource for understanding the level of quality of life in our society and help raise public interest in quality of life measurement. Furthermore, we hope that it will be widely used across various policy areas concerned with improving quality of life, ultimately contributing to a better quality of life for all citizens.

Director-general, Data and Statistics Research Institute, Jin Kim

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
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QUALITY OF LIFE KEY INDICATORS




Indicators Improved from the Previous Period

Average Monthly Wage increased from 3.554 million KRW in 2023 to **3.572** million KRW in 2024




Interpersonal Trust increased from 52.7% in 2023 to **55.7**% in 2024




Indicators Deteriorated from the Previous Period

Social Group Participation Rate declined from 58.2% in 2023 to **52.3**% in 2024



Employment Rate of College Graduates declined from 70.3% in 2023 to **69.5**% in 2024




Indicators Showing a Recent Improving Trend

Job satisfaction increased from 35.0% in 2021 to **38.3**% in 2025



Equivalised Median Income increased from 31.31 million KRW in 2021 to **34.44** million KRW in 2024




Indicators Showing a Recent Deteriorating Trend


Suicide Rate increased from 26.0 deaths per 100,000 population in 2021 to **29.1** deaths in 2024




Relative Poverty Rate increased from 14.8% in 2021 to **15.3**% in 2024




Culture, Art and Sport Event increased from 4.5 times in 2021 to **7.1** times in 2025




Fine Dust Concentration Level declined from 24 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ in 2021 to **16** $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ in 2024



Institutional Trust declined from 55.4% in 2021 to **49.6**% in 2024



Live-alone Elderly Rate increased from 22.0% in 2021 to **23.7**% in 2024




PART 1

Overview

- 01 · Background
- 02 · Purpose
- 03 · What is ‘Quality of Life’?
- 04 · Framework
- 05 · Criteria for Indicator Selection
- 06 · Criteria to Determine Recent Trends
- 07 · Indicator Management Procedures
- 08 · Indicator System
- 09 · Summary of Recent Trends

01
Background

The quality-of-life indicators were developed with consideration given to domestic circumstances and international trends in well-being. Despite Korea’s achievements in industrialisation and democratisation, levels of life satisfaction and happiness remain relatively low. The country also faces various social challenges, including a low fertility rate, rapid population ageing and a high suicide rate, which have weakened the vitality of society. Intense conflicts have also emerged in various areas, including ideological divisions, relative poverty and labour disputes. Against this background, attention needs to shift from economy-centred policies towards well-being-centred policies.



Internationally, quality of life began to receive greater attention, particularly from international organisations, in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1990s, interest in quality of life and sustainability has increased as part of efforts to overcome the limitations of GDP, which focuses primarily on economic aspects.

In 2009, the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, commonly known as the Stiglitz Commission, published its report¹ in France. The report proposed a new indicator framework encompassing quality of life and sustainability, as well as economic conditions, to measure social progress. In 2011, the OECD published *How’s Life?* as an outcome of a global project launched in 2004, presenting a broad range of internationally comparable statistics on well-being. In addition, the European Commission launched discussions on *GDP and Beyond* in 2009 and incorporated the outcomes into the Europe 2020 Strategy. Various measurement initiatives have also been undertaken at the national level.

¹ Stiglitz, Joseph E., Amartya Sen & Jean-Paul Fitoussi(2009), “Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress

02
Purpose

The ultimate purpose of this report is to measure key indicators that capture the current state of various domains contributing to ‘quality of life’, to present an objective picture of ‘life quality’ in Korea and to provide the basic data needed to formulate and implement policies aimed at improving quality of life. The report is intended to provide a basis for identifying strengths and weaknesses of Korean society and addressing issues in individual domains.

History

2011	Developed the basic framework for the quality of life and indicator system via external joint research • ¹Analysis Framework for Measuring Quality of Life in Korea₁, joint research with the Korean Journal of Sociology • 84 indicators in 9 domains
2012-2013	Developed new indicators Reviewed the feasibility of the indicator system together with internal/external experts and changed some indicators • 83 indicators in 12 domains(9 deleted, 8 added, 6 revised) • Classified the existing material conditions into four domains(income/ consumption/wealth, employment & labour, social welfare, housing)
2014	Established the website (qol.kostat.go.kr) and launched services Reviewed the indicator system together with internal/external experts • 81 indicators in 12 domains(2 deleted, 13 revised) Formed the Indicator Review Committee
2015	Reviewed indicators through the Indicator Review Committee(a change in the sub-category of Environment domain) • 81indicators in 12 areas(1 deleted, 1 added, 7 revised)
2016	Reviewed indicators through the Indicator Review Committee • 80 indicators in 12 domains(1 deleted, 3 revised)
2017	Prepared the report ¹Quality of Life Indicators in Korea 2017₁, Collected public opinions online
2018	Revised the indicator system • 71 indicators in 11 domains(social welfare domain deleted; 17 deleted, 8 added, 8 revised)
2019	Published the report ¹Quality of Life Indicators in Korea 2019₁(Released online each year)
2020	Collected public opinions(important areas, key indicators)
2021	Analyzed the long-term trends of quality of life indicators
2022	Published the report ¹Children & Youth Well-being 2022₁
2023	Conducted a research ¹The Framework of Measuring Quality of Life by Life Cycle₁
2024	Reconstituted the Indicator Review Committee and formed of Child&Youth, Young Adults, and Older People Subcommittees
2025	Published the reports ¹Children & Youth Well-being 2025₁ and ¹Youth Well-being in Korea 2025₁

03

What is 'Quality of Life'?

Quality of life is a broad concept encompassing all elements that make life valuable. It comprises objective living conditions and people's subjective perceptions and evaluations of those conditions. More specifically, the concept is defined differently by different scholars, and terms such as quality of life, welfare, well-being, happiness, subjective well-being and subjective satisfaction are often used interchangeably depending on what is being measured. Quality of life, welfare and well-being tend to focus more on objective conditions, while subjective well-being, satisfaction and happiness place relatively greater emphasis on subjective assessments.

As quality of life reflects the social values and norms that define desirable conditions, it is a relative concept that varies across societies and over time, rather than an absolute concept that transcends time and place. In addition, it is an inclusive concept that encompasses not only quality of life of individuals as members of society, but also the quality of society itself.

04

Framework

The 11 domains used to measure quality of life are arranged in concentric circles centred on the individual. Subjective well-being, which reflects individuals' life satisfaction, lies at the centre; the individual dimension occupies the inner circle, social relationships the middle circle, and environmental conditions the outermost circle. The targets and key features of each dimension are as follows.

Target from the perspective of individuals


'Capable individuals' who acquire the knowledge and skills needed for work through education and enjoy economic prosperity, welfare benefits, and healthy lives

Target from the perspective of social relationship

A 'mutually supportive and active community' in which people benefit from social cohesion and solidarity, actively engage in civic activities, and enjoy leisure and cultural activities

Target from the perspective of environmental conditions

A 'safe and sustainable environment' that protects people from danger and supports sustainable living through environmental protection



05
Criteria for
Indicator
Selection

The quality-of-life indicators include objective and subjective indicators for each domain and are selected based on their relevance to quality of life. The main selection criteria are relevance, data quality and neutrality.

Criteria for Indicator Selection

RELEVANCE

- **Face validity** Measurable degree as intended
- **Output-focused** Indicators focusing more on outputs than on inputs/courses
- **Understandability** Indicators easily understandable without obscurity
- **Policy Response** Indicators that sensitively change depending on policy intervention
- **Domestic Compatibility** Indicators befitting the Korean context

DATA QUALITY

- **Official statistics** Official statistics universally used to measure the quality of life
- **Comprehensive coverage** Indicators that possibly encompass the entire population
- **Time series** Cumulative data repetitively measured with the same yardstick

NEUTRALITY

- Indicators with no political bias reflected

06
Criteria to
Determine
Recent Trends

Recent trends indicate whether each of the 71 indicators contributed to improving quality of life. As each indicator has different update interval and directionality, indicators are classified as ‘improved’, ‘deteriorated’ and ‘no change’ by comparing the latest values with the previous ones and assessing whether the change represents an improvement or deterioration in quality of life. For example, the ‘Employment Rate’ indicator is classified as ‘improved’ when its value increases, as a higher employment rate indicates an improvement in quality of life. Meanwhile, a rise in the ‘Unemployment Rate’ indicates deterioration in quality of life, and is therefore classified as ‘deteriorated.’ In short, changes in indicator values are assessed according to whether they contribute to an improvement or deterioration in quality of life.

Assessment & Thresholds ²

	Improved	A change in the recent measurement values leading to a better quality of life compared to the previous figure. $X_t - X_{t-1} > 0$
	No change	No change in recent measurement values compared to the previous figure. $X_t - X_{t-1} = 0$
	Deteriorated	A change in the recent measurement values leading to a worse quality of life compared to the previous figure. $X_t - X_{t-1} < 0$


² As for indicators at a 1-year interval, they are compared with data from the previous year whereas indicators at an interval of two years or longer are compared with previous measurements.

Indicator Intervals
1-yr interval: 45 indicators
2-yr interval: 23 indicators
3-to 5-yr interval: 3 indicators


07
Indicator
Management
Procedures

The individual indicators are not regarded as final and require continuous revision in response to changes in statistical production and society. Accordingly, they are updated through regular reviews and evaluations. For this process, the ‘Indicator Review Committee’ has been formed with 11 domain-specific experts to secure neutrality and objectivity.

Indicator Management Process



Indicator Review Committee



- Indicator reviewer(one per domain)
- Consultants(five per domain)

08

Indicator Framework

The quality-of-life indicator framework in Korea comprises 71 indicators across 11 domains. Each domain includes both objective and subjective indicators. In total, there are 42 objective (59.2%) and 29 subjective indicators (40.8%). Each indicator is classified as positive (+) or negative (-) depending on whether an increase in its value contributes to an improvement in or deterioration in quality of life.

	Objective Indicators(42)	Subjective Indicators(29)
Family · Community	⊖ Live-alone Elderly Rate ⊖ Social Isolation* ⊕ Social Group Participation Rate	⊕ Family Relationship Satisfaction ⊕ Sense of Belonging to a Community
Health	⊕ Life Expectancy* ⊕ Healthy Life Expectancy ⊕ Physical Activity Rate ⊖ Obesity Rate ⊖ Suicide Rate*	⊕ Self-reported Health ⊖ Stress Self-recognition
Education	⊕ Preschool Enrollment Rate ⊕ Population with Tertiary Education ⊕ Employment Rate of College Graduates	⊕ Perception toward Effects of School Education ⊕ School Life Satisfaction* ⊖ Degree of Education Cost Burden
Employment · Wage	⊕ Employment Rate* ⊖ Unemployment Rate* ⊕ Average Monthly Wage ⊖ Working Hours ⊖ Proportion of Low-paid Workers	⊕ Job Satisfaction
Income · Consumption · Wealth	⊕ Gross National Income per Capita* ⊕ Equivalised Median Income ⊕ Household Net Wealth ⊖ Household Debt Ratio ⊖ Relative Poverty Rate*	⊕ Income Satisfaction ⊕ Consumption Satisfaction
Leisure	⊕ Leisure Time* ⊕ Travel Days per Person ⊕ Ratio of Expenditure on Leisure ⊕ Participation in Culture, Art & Sport Event	⊕ Leisure Satisfaction* ⊕ Sufficiency of Leisure Time
Housing	⊕ Residential Area per Capita ⊖ Commuting Time to Office ⊖ Dwelling without Basic Facilities* ⊖ Rent to Income Ratio* ⊕ Home-ownership Rate	⊕ Housing Environment Satisfaction

	Objective Indicators(42)	Subjective Indicators(29)
Environment	- Fine Dust Concentration Level(Particulate Matter Concentration, PM_{2.5})* + Urban Park Area per Capita + Waterworks Supply Rate in Rural Area	- Climate Change Recognition + Air Quality Satisfaction + Water Quality Satisfaction* + Soil Quality Satisfaction + Noise Level Satisfaction + Green Environment Satisfaction
Safety	- Homicide Rate - Child Abuse Rate - Crime Victimization Rate - Child Mortality Rate from Safety Accidents - Industrial Accident Mortality Rate* - Number of Fire Fatalities - Road Traffic Accident Fatality Rate*	+ Feeling Safe Walking Alone at Night* + Perception toward Societal Safety
Civic Engagement	+ Voter Turnout Rate + Voluntary Work Participation Rate	+ Perception of Political Empowerment + Citizenship + Corruption Perceptions Index* + Interpersonal Trust + Institutional Trust
Subjective Well-being	-	+ Life Satisfaction* + Positive Emotions - Negative Emotions

Those marked with * refer to key indicators.

09

Summary of Recent Trends

The Quality of Life Indicators in Korea are designed to analyse long-term changes in quality of life, rather than short-term trends observed on a monthly or quarterly basis. These indicators use annual data to monitor the overall quality of life in society.

Since the Quality of Life Indicators in Korea are compiled from various statistical sources, publication cycles, release timing and update schedules vary across indicators. Some indicators are published within the same year of data collection (e.g., the Social Survey, conducted in May and published in November of the same year), while others are released two to three years later (e.g., the Crime Victimisation Survey, which is published two years after data collection).

To enhance timeliness, the Quality of Life Indicators in Korea are updated quarterly and published on the website. This report is based on indicators updated as of December 2025. Among the 71 indicators, 52 were updated using statistics

Indicators updated in each year
(as of Dec 2025)

11 indicators in 2025

56 indicators in 2024

4 indicators in 2020–2023

Updated Indicators by Year

	Total	Improved	Deteriorated	No change
2024	41	1	14	6
2025	11	8	1	2
Total	52	29	15	8

published in 2025. The remaining 19 indicators, with reporting cycles of two years or more, had no new data released in 2025 and therefore contain the same information as in the previous year’s report.

Due to varying publication timelines, as of December 2025, only 11 indicators (15.5%) were based on 2025 data, while 56 indicators (78.9%) included 2024 data. Thus, most of the indicators were based on data for 2024.

Among the 52 indicators updated in 2025, 29 indicators showed improvement, 15 deteriorated, and 8 remained unchanged compared with the previous period. Of 52 indicators, 11 were based on 2025 data and 41 on 2024 data.

Among the 11 indicators based on 2025 data, 8 showed improvement, while among 41 indicators with 2024 data, only 21 improved, indicating a relatively low proportion of improvement among indicators with 2024 data.

Many indicators based on 2024 data generally remained stagnant or declined slightly following the sharp deterioration during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the recent-trend classification, however, even a small change from the previous period can result in an indicator being classified as deteriorated. For example, dwellings without basic facilities, the social group participation rate, the preschool enrollment rate, the employment rate of college graduates and income satisfaction were classified as deteriorated because of small changes from the previous period, despite showing improving long-term trends overall.

Among the indicators that improved, the employment rate, job satisfaction, equivalised median income, the waterworks supply rate in rural areas and urban park area per capita have shown consistent improvement. Fine dust concentration remained stagnant after improving sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic but improved considerably in 2024.

By domain, no indicator deteriorated in the Employment-Wage domain, while only one deteriorated in the Leisure domain. The proportions of improved indicators were therefore relatively high in these domains. By contrast, the Family-Community domain had no improved indicators, with three deteriorated and two unchanged. The Safety, Environment and Education domains also had relatively high proportions of deteriorated indicators. The proportion of improved indicators had previously been high in the Education domain. However, subjective indicators deteriorated, while the preschool enrollment rate and the employment rate of college graduates—both of which had consistently improved—declined slightly. Consequently, the proportion of deteriorated indicators in the domain became relatively high.

Overall Recent Trend (As of Dec 2025) Improved 37, Deteriorated 25, No change 9



Note 1 Values and relevant data of each indicator can be downloaded from the website(index.go.kr).

2 Indicators marked with * refer to indicators updated at an interval of 2 years or longer. As no new data for those indicators were released in 2025, their values are the same as those reported in Dec 2024.

PART 2

Domain-specific Measurement Results

- 01 · Family·Community
- 02 · Health
- 03 · Education
- 04 · Employment·Wage
- 05 · Income·Consumption·Wealth
- 06 · Leisure
- 07 · Housing
- 08 · Environment
- 09 · Safety
- 10 · Civic Engagement
- 11 · Subjective Well-being

Family·Community




About

Families and communities contribute to improvement of the quality of life by providing individuals with emotional, physical and financial care and support. As families and communities both provide caring services and psychological stability based on relationship among members and interact with each other, they are grouped under the same domain. Under the protection of a family and community, individuals enjoy care, support and safety and take advantage of opportunities of education, healthcare, leisure and relationship. In addition, senses of identity and belonging as well as social values and norms are reproduced through a family and community.

Recent Trends

Among five indicators in the ‘Family and Community’ domain, three indicators showed a decline compared with the previous trend, while the other two remained unchanged. The live-alone elderly rate increased slightly from the previous period, and this upward trend is expected to continue in line with demographic change. Satisfaction with family relationships declined slightly, while the sense of belonging to a community remained unchanged at 72.4% in 2024. Following a notable increase in 2023, participation in social groups declined in 2024. Social isolation, which worsened in 2021 due to COVID-19-related restrictions on social contact, remained unchanged from the previous period.



Live-alone Elderly Rate



DEFINITION A proportion of people living alone among those aged 65 and over living in private households
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of people aged 65 and over living in single-person households ÷ People aged 65 and over living in private households)×100

23.7% in 2024, up 0.4%p from previous year


Many countries including South Korea suffer from both low birth rates and the ageing phenomenon. As a result, the proportion of the aged population has rapidly increased. Out of the old-age population, the elderly living alone are the most vulnerable. Korea’s social security systems for older persons are less developed than those in countries which have experienced ageing earlier. For older persons in Korea, family members including children are the most important supporters for their socio-economic well-being. Older persons living with a spouse or family members can have various supports in economic, material and emotional aspects; on the other hand, those living alone have no one to rely on. As older persons age, they may face increasing difficulties in carrying out basic daily activities due to chronic diseases. Therefore, older persons living alone are an important policy concern in the area of social welfare.

The older population is also vulnerable to mental health issues, in addition to economic hardship and physical health limitations. Korea has the highest suicide rate among older persons in the OECD. Older persons living alone are particularly vulnerable to loneliness and depression, as they are more likely to experience social isolation. Greater policy attention is required beyond economic assistance.

Out of the population aged 65 and over, the number of older persons living alone stood at 2,289,000 or 23.7% of persons aged 65 and over in private households in 2024. The live-alone elderly rate, which increased steadily from 16.2% in 2000 to 18.1% in 2005 and 20.2% in 2010, saw slower growth from 2015 onward. Nevertheless, the overall upward trend has continued. While the number of the individuals aged 65 and over in private households rose by around 2.9 times from 3,346,821 in 2000 to 9,666,500 in 2024, the number of those living alone increased by around 4.2 times from 542,690 to 2,288,807 during the same period. Among 17 regions, the proportion of elderly living alone is higher in provincial areas than in metropolitan cities. In particular, the proportion in


Jeollanam-do is the highest at 28.7%. On the other hand, the proportion of older persons living alone is relatively low in Seoul, Sejong, and Gyeonggi-do, at around 20%. Compared with 2015, the proportion in Daegu and Gwangju increased by 6%p, a larger increase than in other regions.

Live-alone elderly rate; 2000 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Population Census’
NOTE Households in collective living quarters, special enumeration districts and foreign households are excluded.

Live-alone elderly rate by region; 2015, 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Population Census’
NOTE Households in collective living quarters, special enumeration districts and foreign households are excluded.

Family Relationship Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their family relationship
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall family relationship


63.5% in 2024, down 1.0%p from 2022

Satisfaction with family relationship plays a key role in subjective well-being. Despite individualisation and diverse family types, people still value families as the source of a sense of belonging, solidarity and intimacy and are hoping for a happy family life. As a family is a group of people with different genders and generations living together, potential tensions and conflicts exist. Recently, families in Korea have begun to move away from traditional family structures defined by social norms, with greater emphasis placed on emotional bonds. In this sense, the family relationship satisfaction shows how well such the anticipation for family relations is being fulfilled and serves as an indicator of the quality in family life.


The satisfaction with family relationship increased from 50.4% in 2006 to 56.1% in 2008, followed by the stagnation at 56.6% for almost a decade from 2008 to 2018. It again rose to 58.8% in 2020 and to 64.5% in 2022, indicating that the family relationship satisfaction improved with an increase in the stay-at-home time during the COVID-19 pandemic. After a sharp increase in 2022, the family relationship satisfaction slightly decreased to 63.5% in 2024. However, it remains at a higher level compared with the previous trend.

Men had slightly higher(2.9%p) satisfaction with family relations than women did. In 2024, the proportions of those satisfied stood at 64.9% for men and 62.0% for women. Such a trend has continued since 2006. By age group, the older they got, the lower the satisfaction level became. About 80.8% of teenagers aged 13 to 19 answered positively about their family relationship. On the other hand, the number dropped to 58.1% among the population aged 50 to 59 and even to 55.0% among those aged 60 and over, showing different levels of satisfaction depending on generations. Compared with 2022, the rate decreased by nearly 2%p

among those in their 20s and 30s, while it saw a slight increase among those aged 60 and over.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

Sense of Belonging to a Community



DEFINITION A proportion of the population with a sense of belonging to the community that they live in
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very much” or “somewhat” to the question asking whether to have a strong sense of belonging to a community(city/province) that they currently live in


72.4% in 2024, unchanged from previous year

As family size and functions have declined, some traditional family roles are increasingly replaced by local community. The sense of belonging to a community in which people currently live can serve as an important indicator of social integration and cohesion. Stronger social cohesion within a community is associated with a stronger sense of belonging to the community. Social cohesion in the community is an important factor affecting quality of life, particularly as the share of single-person households continues to rise.


The proportion of people who felt a sense of belonging to their city/province stood at 72.4% in 2024, unchanged from the previous year. The sense of belonging to a community had decreased from 64.0% in 2013 to 62.5% in 2014 and to 56.9% in 2016, but it started to rise in 2017. By age group, respondents aged under 40 reported a weaker sense of belonging to the community, at around 70%, whereas the figure was higher, at 76.1%, among those aged 60 and over. This suggests that the older the age group, the stronger the sense of belonging to the community. Compared with 2023, the largest decline, at 1.8%p, was observed among those aged 60 and over, while the proportion increased by 5.9%p among respondents aged 30 to 39.

The sense of belonging varied by the geographic level of the community. It stood at 72.4% for Si/Do, compared with 70.4% for Si/Gun/Gu and 68.4% for Eup/Myeon/Dong, suggesting that a narrower local unit is associated with a lower sense of belonging.


This trend was also evident between urban and rural areas. In rural areas, the sense of belonging to Si/Gun/Gu was higher than in urban areas. In particular, the urban-rural gap was more pronounced at the Eup/Myeon/Dong level, with 67.9% in urban areas and 70.5% in rural areas.



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」
NOTE From 2020, the survey population changed from people aged 19–69 to people aged 19 and over.



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

Social Group Participation Rate




DEFINITION A proportion of the population participating in social group activities
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “sometimes engaging in activities as a member” or “actively engaging in activities as a member” in any of nine social groups* listed below(*A political party, labour union, religious group, club, civic group, local social gathering, voluntary service/donation group, alumni/hometown association or socio-economic organization)


52.3% in 2024, down 5.9%p from previous year

The social group participation rate reflects the extent to which people engage in community activities. Recent research on social capital, which underpins community life, suggests that active participation in social groups provides a basis for community development. Participation in social groups representing different interests and purposes also indicates the overall level and patterns of civic participation. The social group participation rate is measured as the proportion of people who participate either occasionally or actively as members of any of the nine social groups. The proportion increased from 51.5% in 2015 to 53.8% in 2016 and showed little change thereafter. In 2020, however, social activities declined markedly during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rate fell to 46.4%. It then increased again, reaching 58.3% in 2023, up 7.3%p from the previous year and the highest level since 2015. In 2024, however, it fell by 5.9%p to 52.3%.

In 2024, 53.9% of men participated in social groups, compared with 50.7% of women. By age group, the highest participation rate was recorded among those in their 50s, at 59.0%. The rate was lower among younger adults aged 19 to 29 (49.0%) and older persons aged 60 and over (49.5%). A higher social group participation rate generally indicates a higher level of social capital. In Korea, however, the social groups in which people most commonly participate in are private gatherings, such as alumni associations (30.2%), clubs (21.0%), and religious groups (17.0%), which are primarily oriented towards personal relationships. This suggests that social participation in Korea remains concentrated in a limited number of activities and is not necessarily linked to broader forms of social capital. In 2024, however, participation in alumni associations and clubs declined by 11.8%p and 2.5%p, respectively, while participation in labour unions, civic organisations and political parties increased by 3-4%p from the previous year.



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」 Raw data
NOTE From 2020, the survey population changed from people aged 19–69 to people aged 19 and over.



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」 Raw data



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」
NOTE ① These are ratios of people occasionally or actively engaging in activities as a member of a social group. ② The survey covered the population aged 19 and over.

Social Isolation



DEFINITION A proportion of people who don't have anyone to turn to in case of a physical or mental emergency
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that there was no one to turn to even if they needed someone either to ‘help with housework’ or ‘talk to’


33.0% in 2025, unchanged from previous year

The indicator of ‘social isolation’ shows the strength and breadth of social networks, which serve as an important foundation of social capital. In particular, having no one to turn to for personal or emotional support affects not only individual quality of life but also societal well-being.


The social isolation indicator measures the proportion of people who have no one to help them with housework when they are ill or to talk to when needed. In 2025, the proportion stood at 33.0%, unchanged from 2023. Previously, it had shown a downward trend, declining slightly from 32.9% in 2013. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, social distancing measures led to a sharp increase to 34.1% in 2021. Despite a slight decline in 2023, the proportion remained above the pre-pandemic level.

By gender, the proportion was higher among men (35.7%) than among women (30.5%). Compared with 2023, it declined among women but increased among men. By age group, the older the age group, the higher the level of social isolation. The proportion was 24.4% among those aged 19 to 29 and 26.5% among those aged 30 to 39, compared with 39.4% among those aged 60 and over. Across age groups, the proportion declined relative to 2023 except among those in their 50s, for whom it increased by 2.2%p.


For each item, 24.9% of respondents reported having no one to ask for help with housework, while 21.3% reported having no one to talk to. In particular, the proportion of those with no one to talk to was highest among persons aged 60 and over, at 27.7%, compared with 15% to 22% in other age groups. This suggests that older persons are more vulnerable to emotional isolation.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」 raw data
NOTE The survey covered the population aged 19 and over.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」 raw data



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
NOTE These are proportions of people having no one to help them for each item.

02

Health




About

In the health domain, an important consideration is not only how long people live, but also how well they live. From the individual perspective, good health is a foundation for quality of life, as it enhances life satisfaction and enables people to actively engage in various areas of life. Good physical and mental health also benefit society in many ways, which is why communities place considerable importance on the health of their members. The health domain consists of individuals' healthy behaviours and health conditions.

Recent Trends

Among the seven indicators included in the health domain, four improved, two deteriorated, and one remained unchanged. Life expectancy has consistently increased over time, except for a slight decline in 2022. Healthy life expectancy has remained stagnant since 2019. The improving trend of stress self-recognition continued, with a marked decrease in 2024 compared with 2022. Self-reported health status and physical activity rate also improved compared with 2022. After a sharp increase during COVID-19 pandemic, the obesity rate fluctuated between 37% and 38%, while the suicide rate, which had been declining steadily, turned upward in 2022.



Life Expectancy



DEFINITION The average number of years a newborn(age 0) is expected to live
HOW TO MEASURE The average number of years a newborn(age 0) is expected to live

83.7 years in 2024, up 0.2 from previous year



Health status can be measured using indicators related to deaths and disease. Mortality affects life expectancy of the population: as the number of deaths declines, life expectancy increases. This is why indicators such as life expectancy and the infant mortality rate are widely used to assess the health status of the population. Life expectancy refers to the average number of years a person is expected to live, based on the mortality conditions of a given year. More precisely, it refers to life expectancy at birth.

Life expectancy of Koreans increased by more than 20 years, from 62.3 years in 1970 to 83.7 years in 2024. It rose steadily, increasing by 0.2 to 0.6 years annually, from 76.0 years in 2000 to 78.2 years in 2005 and to 80.2 years in 2010. Due to COVID-19-related deaths, the upward trend in life expectancy was interrupted by a decline from 83.6 years in 2021 to 82.7 years in 2022, but increased again thereafter.

Women had a longer life expectancy than men in 2024, at 86.6 years compared with 80.8 years for men, a gap of 5.8 years. The gap in life expectancy between men and women gradually narrowed from 7.4 years in 2000 and remained relatively stable from 2022 onward.

Life expectancy is a representative indicator used to compare health status across countries. In Korea, the life expectancy reached 80 years around 2010, bringing it

to the level in developed countries. As one of the countries with the highest life expectancy in the world, Korea ranked sixth among OECD countries in 2023. Switzerland recorded the highest life expectancy at 84.3 years, while Japan and Spain also reported high levels above 84 years. Korea's life expectancy increased by 7.5 years over the past 23 years from 2000 to 2023, from 76.0 years to 83.5 years, which was a larger increase than in other OECD countries.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Life Table」

SOURCE OECD, *OECD Health Statistics* (retrieved in Dec 2025)
NOTE ☉ Out of figures for 2000, Latvia used data of the year 2002. ☉ Out of figures for 2023, Türkiye used data of the year 2022.

Healthy Life Expectancy




DEFINITION Expected years when a person can physically and mentally enjoy a healthy life excluding a period of disease or disabilities from life expectancy
HOW TO MEASURE A period excluding the total population's average period of diseases or disabilities from life expectancy

72.5 years in 2021, unchanged from previous year


Given that life expectancy is an indicator of the quantitative aspect of health, healthy life expectancy focuses on the qualitative aspect. As life expectancy rises, people tend to live longer. However, living longer in poor health and living a long and healthy life have very different impacts on individuals and society as a whole. A simple increase in life expectancy of individuals does not always result in better health conditions in society.

In this sense, healthy life expectancy refers to the number of years a person is expected to live in a healthy state, excluding periods in which they are unable to function properly due to illness or injury. With rising life expectancy, healthy life expectancy has also increased. In Korea, the healthy life expectancy rose by 5.9 years to 72.5 years in 2021 from 66.6 years in 2000. This increase implies an improvement in Koreans' health conditions both in quality and quantity. Given that life expectancy increased by 7.6 years over the same period, however, the improvement in quality was relatively limited and has been stagnant since 2019. As with life expectancy, women had longer healthy life expectancy than men. In 2021, women were expected to live for 74.1 years, 3.4 years longer than men (70.7 years). That said, the gender gap has narrowed since 2000 (5.0 years). Compared with other



SOURCE WHO, World Health Statistics (retrieved in Jan 2025)

countries, Korea ranked second place among OECD members in healthy life expectancy, after Japan(73.4 years). While the healthy life expectancy declined between 2019 and 2021 in most OECD countries due to COVID-19, Korea maintained the same level in 2021 as in 2019.



SOURCE WHO, World Health Statistics (retrieved in Jan 2025)

Stress Self-recognition



DEFINITION A proportion of the population feeling stressed in their daily life
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “severely stressed out” or “moderately stressed out” regarding their daily life for the past two weeks


38.4% in 2024, down 6.5%p from 2022

Individual health consists of both physical and mental health, and the significance of mental health has been increasingly recognised. As stress is part of daily life, it is a key indicator of mental health. Frequent stress in daily life has a substantial effect on individuals' lives, as it is associated not only with mental health but also with physical health.


Stress self-recognition, measured as the proportion of respondents who reported feeling stressed over the past two weeks, fell by 6.5%p from 44.9% in 2022 to 38.4% in 2024. After rising from 60.4% in 2008 to 70.0% in 2010, it showed a downward trend. In particular, it declined markedly from 66.6% in 2014 to 54.7% in 2016 and this downward movement has continued since 2020.

By gender, women (40.1%) reported higher stress self-recognition than men (36.7%). Since 2010 when men recorded a higher rate than women, women have constantly reported higher levels of stress self-recognition.

By age group, people in their 40s showed the highest level of stress self-recognition. In other age groups, the level tended to be lower as the age is younger or older than 40s. A similar pattern has been observed since 2008. Compared with 2022, the stress self-recognition declined by 5%p or more in almost all age groups except those in their 60s(-1.8%p). In particular, those in their 30s saw a significant decrease of -11.2%p.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, Social Survey
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, Social Survey

Self-reported Health




DEFINITION A proportion of the population assessing themselves as healthy
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents that replied “very good” or “good” regarding their overall health conditions

53.8% in 2024, up 0.7%p from 2022

Health conditions have traditionally been measured with some objective indicators such as life expectancy or prevalence rates. However, self-reported physical and mental health has been recently considered as a crucial indicator of individuals’ health status, regardless of medical diagnosis. In other words, self-reported health captures how individuals perceive their own health, irrespective of the presence of diseases. For example, a person taking medication for high blood pressure may still feel healthy if the person is able to function without any difficulty. In contrast, a person may underestimate the person’s own health due to anxiety or concern even in the absence of visible symptoms. Although subjective assessments do not always correspond to objective health conditions, they can have a significant influence on quality of life.

According to the self-reported health item in 「Social Survey」 conducted by the Ministry of Data and Statistics, the proportion of people who assessed their own health as good increased by 0.7%p from 53.1% in 2022 to 53.8% in 2024. After rising from 44.6% in 2006 to 51.6% in 2008, it fell to 45.3% in 2012 before increasing again afterwards, including the COVID-19 pandemic.

By gender, 57.2% of men assessed their own health as good while 50.5% of women did so. This pattern has remained consistent over time. By age group, the younger the respondents were, the better their self-reported health was. While 83.8% of those aged 13 to 19 reported good health, only 34.1% of those aged 60 and over did so. Compared with 2022, the proportion increased by less than 1%p among those in their 40s and 50s, while it rose by 3.6%p among those aged 13 to 19 and by 2.6%p among those aged 60 and over.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

Obesity Rate



DEFINITION A proportion of the population with BMI (body mass index) of 25 or higher
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of people with body mass index (BMI) of 25 or higher (BMI = Weight (kg) ÷ [Height (m)]²)


38.1% in 2024, up 0.9%p from 2023

As a relatively new threat to health, obesity has been recognised as a major contributor to chronic conditions and diseases. It is associated with increased consumption of processed foods, overnutrition and a lack of physical activity. Unlike lifestyle factors such as smoking or drinking, obesity is also closely related to economic development and lifestyle changes, which makes it difficult to address. In particular, obesity is strongly associated with chronic diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes, and it significantly affects quality of life.


After rising from 29.2% in 2001 to 31.3% in 2005, the obesity rate remained at a similar level, with some ups and downs. From 2015 onward, it stayed between 33% and 34%, before increasing by 4.5%p from 2019 to 38.3% in 2020. The sharp increase may have reflected restricted outdoor activities, limited access to sports facilities, and more time spent at home, including working from home and remote learning, during the COVID-19 pandemic. After a slight decline to 37.1% in 2021, it remained stable before rising again to 38.1% in 2024, indicating it has not yet returned to its earlier trend.

By gender, the obesity rate among men has continuously increased from 31.8% in 2001, while the rate among women has remained relatively stable between 24% and 28%. In 2024, the obesity rate was 48.8% for men and 26.2% for women, a gap of 22.6%p. The gender gap has widened from 17.8%p in 2023.

By age group, the obesity rate was relatively low among those aged 19-29 (33.5%) and among those aged 70 and over (35.3%) in 2024, whereas it was higher among those in their 40s at 44.1%. Compared with 2023, the rate for those in their 40s rose markedly by 6.4%p, a larger increase than in the other age groups.



SOURCE Korea Disease Control & Prevention Agency, 「Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey」



SOURCE Korea Disease Control & Prevention Agency, 「Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey」
NOTE Data are age-standardised figures based on the estimated population for 2005.

Suicide Rate




DEFINITION The number of suicide deaths out of 100,000 population
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of suicide deaths ÷ No. of registered population) × 100,000

29.1 deaths in 2024, up 1.8 from previous year


In general, life satisfaction and suicide rates are closely related. As an indicator of mental health associated with depression, the suicide rate is closely linked to individuals' quality of life. It also reflects structural characteristics of society and the degree of social integration. Particularly, suicide rates tend to rise when sudden disruption or severe instability occurs in a society. The total number of suicides in 2024 was 14,872, equivalent to 29.1 deaths per 100,000 population. It was an increase of 1.8 deaths per 100,000 population from the previous year. The suicide rate per 100,000 population rose by 10 deaths or more, from 14.6 deaths in 2001 to 24.8 deaths in 2005. After reaching a peak of 31.7 in 2011, the rate declined, but began to rise again slightly after 2017. By gender, both men and women recorded increases in suicide rates in 2024 compared with the previous year. The suicide rate for men was 41.8 per 100,000 population in

2023, more than twice the rate for women (16.6). The suicide rate was relatively higher among those aged 40 and over, particularly among those aged 80 and over. Among those in their 40s to 70s, the rate ranged from 31 to 37 per 100,000, compared with 53.3 among those in their 80 and over. By age, suicide rates showed different patterns for men and women. Among men, the rate rises with age, and except among those aged 70 and over, the rates for those in their 40s to 60s were similar. On the other hand, among women, excluding those aged 80 and over, the suicide rate was relatively higher among those in their 30s and 40s. In all age groups, except for those aged 10–19, women had a lower suicide rate than men. However, among the 10–19 age group, the rate was higher for women (8.7) than for men (7.4). Compared with 2023, larger increases in suicide rates were found among men in their 30s to 50s and among women in



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Causes of Death Statistics」

their 30s to 40s. Korea had an exceptionally high suicide rate compared with other countries. According to OECD international comparison data, Korea recorded the highest suicide rate in 2022, at 22.6 deaths per 100,000 population, followed by Slovenia at 17.5. Japan also had a relatively high suicide rate at 15.6, but this remained below the level in Korea. In many other countries, the rate was around 10 deaths per 100,000 population. Since 2000, suicide rates in OECD countries have generally shown a downward trend. Countries with high suicide rates in 2000, such as Latvia, Hungary, Estonia and Finland, have recorded constant declines, with current rates around 15 deaths.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Causes of Death Statistics」



SOURCE OECD, *OECD Health Statistics* (retrieved in Jan 2025)
NOTE ① These are aged-standardised suicide rates. ② Norway used data of the year 2016; New Zealand of the year 2018; Germany of the year 2020; Belgium, Colombia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, of the year 2021. ③ No data are available for the UK and Türkiye for 2000.

Physical Activity Rate



DEFINITION A proportion of the population practicing physical activities in daily life on a regular basis
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that they "practiced" vigorous exercise(hiking, walking, yoga, cycling, etc.) on a regular basis


48.4% in 2024, up 2.9%p from 2022

One of the traditional methods to promote health is physical activity. Physical activity is distinguished from elite sports that it is accessible to everyone, and from labour involving repetitive limited movements that it can strengthen the whole body and improve cardiopulmonary function. Regular physical activity that can be easily incorporated into daily life, such as walking, running, and rope skipping and stretching contributes to better health. It is also known to help prevent obesity.


As part of Social Survey, the Ministry of Data and Statistics asked respondents whether they regularly engaged in physical activities such as hiking, walking, yoga and cycling. The results indicated the physical activity rate in Korea increased steadily from 28.3% in 2006 to 48.4% in 2024.

The physical activity rate was higher among men (50.7%) than among women (46.0%). By region, the rate was 49.3% in urban areas, higher than rural areas with 43.9%. These gender and regional differences have shown the similar trend since 2006.

By age group, those aged 60 and over recorded the highest rate at 52.1%, followed by those in their 20s at 51.3%. In contrast, the rate was lowest among those in their 40s, at 42.9%. Compared with 2022, the physical activity rate increased across all age groups. However, while the rate among individuals aged 40–49 remained nearly the same as in 2022, it rose by 4.1%p among those aged 13–19 , by 5.6%p among individuals in their 20s, and by 5.9%p among those in their 30s, indicating a relatively larger increase among younger age groups.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
NOTE The survey had been conducted on the population aged 15 and over until 2010, and has been done on those aged 13 and over since 2012.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」




About

Education is a process of acquiring and generating knowledge, thereby serving as a driving force for creating material conditions. In social terms, it promotes social stability and contributes to social development, thereby enhancing the quality of society and further affecting individuals' quality of life. In addition, it is regarded as a means of narrowing gaps in quality of life among members of society. It also enables individuals to fulfill their potential. The domain of Education is divided into three areas: educational opportunities (whether sufficient educational opportunities are provided equitably in relation to quality of life), educational resources (whether sufficient resources are allocated so that education can improve quality of life), and educational outcomes (whether education leads to the intended outcomes through the opportunities and resources provided).

Recent Trends

Among the six indicators in the education domain, two improved, while the remaining four deteriorated. The preschool enrollment rate, which had shown a continuous upward trend, has recently stagnated and declined slightly from the previous year. Population with tertiary education continues to improve, and the employment rate of college graduates increased steadily after the COVID-19 period until declining in 2024. School life satisfaction, which fell in 2022, rose again in 2024. The degree of education cost burden and the perception toward effects of school education deteriorated slightly compared with 2022.



Preschool Enrollment Rate




DEFINITION A proportion of children enrolling in a preschool or kindergarten out of the population aged 3 to 5
HOW TO MEASURE $\{(\text{No. of 3- to 5-year-olds in preschool} + \text{No. of 3-to 5-year-olds enrolling in kindergarten}) \div \text{School-age Population (aged 3 to 5)}\} \times 100$

94.1% in 2024, 0.2%p down from previous year

The preschool enrollment rate is an indicator that measures whether education opportunities are provided to members of a society in a timely and adequate manner. It focuses on measurement of educational opportunities prior to the primary education. In Korea, primary and secondary education is available to almost all children. The preschool enrollment rate is therefore a meaningful indicator, as it captures educational opportunities before entry into primary school. Although kindergartens and preschools are currently classified separately as educational institutes and childcare facilities and have not been integrated, both provide educational and child-care services for preschool children. Unlike the previous kindergarten enrollment rate, the rate covers children attending either kindergartens or preschools.

For kindergartens, given the age limit, the population covered is children aged 3 to 5. In 2024, the preschool enrollment rate stood at 94.1%, meaning that more than nine out of ten children aged 3 to 5 attended either daycare or kindergarten. The preschool enrollment rate showed a continuous upward trend. It increased from 56.9% in 2002 to 80.7% in 2008, surpassing the 80% mark, and rose sharply to 91.5% in 2013. Especially, from 2004 to 2007, the rate increased by 4-6%p annually, but since 2008, the growth has remained below 1%p. After surpassing 90% in 2013, the rate showed only slight fluctuations. Although it temporarily declined to around 91% in 2019 and 2020, it rose to 93.5% in 2021 and 94.3% in 2022. Afterward, it remained at a similar level.



SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook of Education」; Ministry of Health and Welfare, 「Statistics on Childcare Facilities and Users」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」 (as of 2022)
NOTE For school-age children, the estimated population data were used.

Degree of Education Cost Burden


DEFINITION A proportion of parents who believe their children’s education expenditures are burdensome relative to their income
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that education expenditures are “very burdensome” or “somewhat burdensome” out of households with students

60.9% in 2024, up 3.2%p from 2022



A rise in education expenditure may undermine equality of educational opportunities and deepen an education gap across social groups. The degree of education cost burden indicates how burdensome education expenditure is relative to the household income.

The degree of education cost burden, defined as the proportion of respondents who perceive their children’s education expenditures as a burden on the household economy, stood at 60.9% in 2024, up 3.2%p from 2022. Since 2008, when it was 79.8%, it had declined continuously, falling below 60% in 2022. It has since risen again, but it remains at a lower level than in earlier years.

The degree of education cost burden varies by the child’s level of schooling and by the age and income level of household head. By age group, parents of preschool or early elementary-school children, typically those in their 30s, reported a relatively lower burden, while those aged 40 and over reported a higher burden. In 2024, 46.1% of household heads in their 30s reported education expenses as burdensome, compared with 62.3% of those in their 40s and 62.9% of those in their 50s reported the same. Compared with 2022, the burden among those in their 30s remained unchanged, while that among those aged



60 and over increased by 7.2%p. Among education-related expenditures, private education was identified as the most burdensome item, with 71.9%. The tuition fees outside school have consistently been perceived as more burdensome, while the share of school payment has declined since 2014. By contrast, the burden associated with boarding and dormitory fees increased from 2.3% in 2010 to 7.0% in 2018, before slightly declining thereafter.



Perception toward Effects of School Education

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who positively recognize efficiency of school education
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that school education is “very effective” or “somewhat effective” in ‘To prepare for adulthood, a career and employment’

42.8% in 2024, down 0.4%p from 2022



As an indicator of how positively individuals evaluate school education, the perception toward effects of school education measures effects of school education based on subjective judgment rather than the objective academic achievement. As a subjective indicator of educational outcomes, it shows how useful school education is perceived to be in real life settings such as daily life, careers and employment.

The proportion of people who believed school education to be effective in ‘preparing for adulthood, a career and employment’ decreased by 0.4%p from 43.2% in 2022 to 42.8% in 2024. After increasing from 27.9% in 2000 to 36.0% in 2014, the trend remained relatively stable. However, it rose to 40.2% in 2020 and 43.2% in 2022, before slightly declining in 2024.

The perception toward effects of school education varied by age groups. The proportion was relatively high among those aged under 30 and those aged 60 and over, but lower among those in their 30s to 50s. It was around 39% among those aged 13 to 19 and 48.7% among those aged 60 and over. Compared with 2022, the proportion increased among those in their 30s and below, but declined among those in their 40s and over.

By education level, the perception toward effects of school education was highest among those with elementary education or below, at 51.6%. This group includes many older persons as well as middle school students. By contrast, the proportion was lower among high school graduates and college graduates, at 39.7% and 42.4%, respectively, and was lowest among high school graduates. Although this group includes current students and therefore does not necessarily reflect final educational attainment, the results suggest people with higher levels of education tend to perceive school education as more effective.

In addition to preparation for adulthood, the survey also covers the effects of school education in terms of ‘acquisition of knowledge and skills,’ ‘morality and character development,’ and ‘formation of national and social perspectives.’ In 2024, ‘acquisition of knowledge and skills’ recorded the highest proportion at 54.6%, while ‘morality and character development’ and ‘formation of national and social perspectives’ were lower, at 38.7% and 34.2%, respectively.



School Life Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of students satisfied with school life

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of middle and high school students who replied that they were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall school life

57.3% in 2024, up 6.2%p from 2022


It is difficult to measure the quality and process of education solely on the basis of schools’ physical environments and facilities, as education also depends heavily on students’ subjective experiences. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the quality of school education through students’ subjective judgements, such as school life satisfaction. As an indicator related to students’ participation in school life and activities, school life satisfaction provides an indirect measure of their experience at school.

The proportion of middle and high school students satisfied with their school life increased by 6.2%p from 51.1% in 2022 to 57.3% in 2024. It had shown an upward trend from 43.1% in 2010, reaching 59.3% in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. It then fell sharply to 51.1% in 2022 before rising again in 2024.

In 2020, despite fewer days of in-person attendance and the introduction of online classes during the COVID-19 pandemic, overall satisfaction with school life continued to increase without a visible change in trend. However, in 2022, the return to full in-person attendance and changes in COVID-19 safety guidelines may have contributed to the decline in students’ satisfaction with school life.

By specific factor, satisfaction with ‘relationships with schoolmates’ was highest at 71.6%, followed by ‘relationships with teachers’ at 65.3%. By contrast, satisfaction with ‘educational methods,’ was the lowest at 50.3%. Compared with 2022, ‘relationships with schoolmates’ declined by 2.5%p while all other factors increased. Especially, satisfaction with ‘school facilities’ and ‘school surroundings’ rose by more than 3%p.


School life satisfaction; 2000 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

NOTE The survey had been conducted on the population aged 15 and over until 2010 and has been done on students attending middle or high school at aged 13 and over since 2012.

School life satisfaction by item; 2022, 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

NOTE The survey had been conducted on middle and high school students aged 13 and over.

Employment Rate of College Graduates



DEFINITION A proportion of the employed out of those eligible for employment after graduation of tertiary education institutes

HOW TO MEASURE (The employed ÷ Those eligible for employment out of graduates of tertiary education institutes) × 100


69.5% in 2024, down 0.8%p from previous year

The employment rate of college graduates is an objective indicator of education outcomes. It shows whether human resources developed through tertiary education are aligned with labour market needs. It also shows how successfully young adults who have completed formal education make the transition into employment, with implications for quality of life and social sustainability.

The employment rate of college graduates declined by 0.8%p to 69.5%. With the exception of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic affected the world, the rate remained in the range of 66% to 68% over the period from 2011 to 2021. In 2020, the rate fell to 65.1%, but recovered to 69.6% in 2022 and 70.3% in 2023 before falling back to 69.5% in 2024. Among college graduates, the employment rate was 71.2% for men and 67.9% for women, a gender gap of 3.3%p. The employment rate for women increased from 64.5% in 2011, narrowing the gender gap from 6.2%p in 2011.

By field of study, the employment rate was the highest in medicine at 79.4%, while it was lowest in liberal arts at 61.1%. Compared with 2023, employment rate declined in all fields except education, where the rate increased by 1.6%p.


Employment rate of college graduates; 2011 – 2024



SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook for Employment」

NOTE ① Tertiary education institutes include universities, technical colleges, industrial colleges and educational colleges. ② The employment rate was calculated in conjunction with the database of health insurance and national taxes.


Employment rate of college graduates by gender; 2011 – 2024



SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook for Employment」

NOTE ① Tertiary education institutes include universities, technical colleges, industrial colleges and educational colleges. ② The employment rate was calculated in conjunction with the database of health insurance and national taxes.

Employment rate of college graduates by field of study; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook for Employment」

NOTE ① Tertiary education institutes include universities, technical colleges, industrial colleges and educational colleges. ② The employment rate was calculated in conjunction with the database of health insurance and national taxes.

Population with Tertiary Education



DEFINITION A proportion of graduates from tertiary education institutes out of the population aged 25 to 64
HOW TO MEASURE (Graduates from tertiary education institutes ÷ Population aged 25 to 64)×100

56.2% in 2024, up 1.7%p from previous year

The population with tertiary education is one of the main indicators of a society’s educational attainment. A higher tertiary education attainment rate generally indicates broader access to higher education. A large share of the population with tertiary education can contribute to the development of human capital and strengthen the foundations for national development.

Korea has a high level of educational attainment and strong demand for education. It also has very high participation rates in primary and secondary education. Once access to


primary and secondary education becomes widespread, demand for tertiary education tends to increase. In 1981, the government introduced a graduation quota system, doubling the number of college entrants. It also eased requirements for establishment of colleges and universities and, from 1995 onward, allowed institutions to determine the size of their incoming classes. As a result, the share of the population with tertiary education increased rapidly.

Among adults aged 25 to 64, the population who had completed tertiary education stood at 24.8% in 2001. This


meant that roughly one person in four adults had completed tertiary education. By 2011, the rate reached 40%, and by 2019, it had risen to 50.0%, meaning that half of the population had completed tertiary education. By 2024, this figure had increased to 56.2%.

By gender, 57.4% of men and 54.9% of women had completed tertiary education, a gap of 2.5%p. This gender gap has gradually narrowed over time. In 2001, the tertiary education attainment rate was 30.5% for men and 19.0% for women, a gap of 11.5%p. By 2007, this gender gap had narrowed to less than 10%p, and since 2019, it has continued to narrow below 5%p.

Korea has a very high tertiary education attainment rate. In 2024, it stood 15.0%p above the OECD average of 41.2%. Countries with higher rates than Korea included Canada(64.7%) and Ireland(57.5%). Korea’s tertiary education attainment rate was already 31.6% in 2005, above the OECD average of 26.3%. Over the period from 2005 to 2023, the OECD average increased by 14.9%p, whereas Korea’s rate increased by 24.6%p. Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United Kingdom also recorded increases of more than 20%p over the same period.



SOURCE OECD, *Education at a Glance* (retrieved in Sept 2025)
NOTE The population with tertiary education refers to a proportion of people who have completed tertiary education out of the population aged 25 to 64.



SOURCE OECD, *Education at a Glance* (retrieved in Sept 2025)
NOTE ① The population with tertiary education refers to a ratio of people who have completed with tertiary education out of the population aged 25 to 64. ② Countries without 2005 data were excluded. (Chile used data of the year 2022; Iceland and the US of the year 2023)




About

The availability of opportunities for economic activity, appropriate compensation for such activity, and the quality of economic activity ultimately affect individuals’ quality of life through final outcomes such as incomes. Economic activity itself can also affect individuals’ quality of life. In a society with sufficient opportunities for economic activity, individuals can benefit from reasonable remuneration, and higher- quality in employment can contribute to a higher quality of life for individuals and society as a whole.

Recent Trends

Among six indicators in the Employment/Wage domain, five improved, while the remaining indicator remained unchanged. As indicators of current labour market conditions, the employment rate improved gradually, while the unemployment rate showed little change. After declining from 2021 onward, average monthly wages rose in 2024. Amid fluctuations in the 2020s, working hours fell by more than 10 hours in 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of low-paid workers increased in both 2022 and 2023, before declining in 2024. Job satisfaction increased in 2025 compared with 2023.



Unemployment Rate





DEFINITION A proportion of the unemployed out of economically active population
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of the unemployed aged 15 and over ÷ Economically active population aged 15 and over) ×100

2.8% in 2024, unchanged from previous year

The unemployed refer to people who have not engaged in any income-generating activity but have actively searched for a job during the past four weeks. In 2025, the unemployment rate was 2.8%, unchanged from 2024. Since recording 3.6% in 2002, the rate has fluctuated, but it showed an upward trend after reaching 3.1% in 2013. The unemployment rate rose to 4.0% in 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19, but then declined to below 3.0%, marking the lowest level since 2000.

By gender, the unemployment rate in 2025 was 2.8% for both men and women, indicating no gender gap. The unemployment rate for women declined slightly compared with 2024. By age group, the unemployment rate was highest among those aged 20–29 at 6.1%, followed by those aged 15–19 at 5.3%. The rate was 2.0% among those in their 40s, while it was lowest among those in their 50s, at 1.8%. Compared with 2024, the unemployment rate for those aged 15–19 increased by 1.9%p, the largest increase among all age groups.



Employment Rate



DEFINITION A proportion of the employed out of the population aged 15 and over
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of the employed aged 15 and over÷ Population aged 15 and over) × 100

62.9% in 2025, up 0.2%p from previous year

The employment rate is the most straightforward indicator of how many people are actually employed and serves as a core measure of labour market conditions. Previously, the labour force participation rate was the primary indicator. However, because of the rising unemployment rate and the ambiguous boundary between the unemployed and the economically inactive population, the employment rate has increasingly been used as the key indicator of labour market conditions.

In 2025, the employment rate was 62.9%, up 0.2%p from the previous year. Since 2002, the employment rate has fluctuated between 59% and 60%, with a slight upward trend from 2014 onward. The rate declined to 60.1% in 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19 but recovered slightly in 2021. It then rose beyond the previous trend, reaching 62.6% in 2023 and 62.9% in 2025.



The employment rate for men was 70.9% in 2025, 15.3%p higher than that for women(55.3%). However, the employment rate for women has risen steadily from 48.5% in 2002, narrowing the gender gap from 23.7%p in 2003.

In 2022, the rate for women recorded a notable increase of 1.7%p compared with the previous year.


By age group, the employment rate was highest among

those in their 30s (80.8%) and in their 40s(79.9%), followed by those in their 50s(77.5%). The next highest rate was recorded among those in their 20s(60.2%), while individuals aged 60 and over recorded 46.7%. Compared with 2024, employment rates declined among those aged under 30, while all other age groups except those in their 50s recorded increases.

Compared with other countries, Korea’s employment rate for those aged 15 and over stood at 62.7% in 2024, above the OECD average of 58.0%. Among individual countries, Iceland recorded the highest employment rate at 73.5%, while Greece, Italy and Türkiye had rates below 50%.




Korea’s employment rate for men stood well above the OECD average. The rate for women was only slightly above the OECD average (51.0%), suggesting that women’s employment remained relatively low. Furthermore, the gender employment gap in Korea was 16.2%p, larger than the OECD average (14.4%p) and that in other countries. Japan also had a relatively large gender employment gap at 15.4%p, although it remained lower than Korea’s. By contrast, many OECD countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and France, had gender employment gaps below 10%p.



SOURCE OECD, Labour Force Statistics (retrieved in Jan 2026)

Korea’s employment rate for those aged 65 and over was 38.2% in 2024, the highest among OECD countries and more than twice the OECD average (16.2%). Among OECD countries, only Korea recorded an employment rate above 30% for those aged 65 and over. Even Japan, despite its high life expectancy, had a lower employment rate for this age group at 25.6%. Countries with similar employment rates for those aged 15 and over, such as Norway and Ireland, recorded rates below 15% for those aged 65 and over.



SOURCE OECD, Labour Force Statistics (retrieved in Jan 2026)

Average Monthly Wage



DEFINITION the value obtained by converting the total monthly wages into the real amount

HOW TO MEASURE (Regular payment + Overtime payment + Annual special payment of the previous year) ÷ 12 months

3.572 million KRW in 2024, up 18,000 KRW from previous year

Workers' wages serve as a key indicator of job quality. The average monthly wage refers to the total amount of wages that workers receive each month, and varies depending on the number of working hours. Although it does not allow for precise comparisons without taking working hours into account, it is a useful indicator of workers' overall wage levels.

The average monthly real wage of wage workers had been on a steady upward trend since 2011, before declining slightly in 2022 and 2023. Taking the Consumer Price Index into account, the average monthly real wage fell from 3.592 million KRW in 2022 to 3.554 million KRW in 2023, before rising to 3.572 million KRW in 2024, up 18,000 KRW from the previous year. While the real wage declined slightly both in 2022 and 2023, the nominal wage continued to increase. In 2024, regular workers earned 4.338 million KRW, while temporary/daily workers earned 1.809 million KRW, equivalent to approximately 41.7% of the wage of regular workers. The wage ratio had remained at around 40% since 2011, but rose to 44.0% in 2020 before declining slightly again in recent years.


The larger the business size is, the higher the monthly average wage per worker is. Workers in businesses with 1–4 employees earned 2.536 million KRW, compared with 6.220 million KRW among those in businesses with 300 or more employees, indicating a substantial wage gap. In particular, the average monthly wage in businesses with 300 or more employees was considerably higher than that in businesses with 100–299 employees (4.770 million KRW).

Average monthly wage; 2011–2024(real wage)



SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor,¹Labor Force Survey at Establishments,
NOTE ① These refer to real wages calculated by applying the consumer price index (the year of 2020 = 100). ② Average monthly wage per worker working in an establishment with one or more permanent employees.

Average monthly wage by employment type & business size; 2024(nominal wage)



SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor,¹Labor Force Survey at Establishments,
NOTE Average monthly wage per worker working in an establishment with one or more permanent employees.

Proportion of Low-paid Workers



DEFINITION A proportion of wage earners who receive less than 2/3 of the monthly median income out of the total wage earners

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of wage earners receiving less than 2/3 of the monthly median income ÷ Total number of wage earners) × 100


16.1% in 2024, down 0.1%p from previous year

The proportion of low-paid workers is one of the key indicators of wage inequality. In general, workers earning less than two-thirds of the median wage are classified as low-paid. A higher proportion of low-paid workers indicates greater wage inequality and a higher risk of in-work poverty. The proportion of low-paid workers showed little change over the 15 years from 2001 to 2015, declining only slightly from 24.2% to 23.5%. It then fell to 19.0% in 2018 and further to 15.6% in 2021. In 2022, however, the proportion increased by 1.3%p to 16.9%, interrupting the downward trend that had begun in 2013. In 2024, it declined to 16.1%, down 0.1%p from the previous year but still above the 2021 level.

The proportion was higher among women than among men. In 2024, the proportion of low-paid workers was 11.1% among men and 23.8% among women, with the rate for women more than twice that for men. However, the proportion among women declined steadily from 45.1% in 2002, narrowing the gender gap from 29.7%p in 2002 to 12.7%p in 2024.


In international comparison, Korea was among the countries with the highest proportions of low-paid workers. In 2023, the proportion in Korea was higher than those in Japan (10.4%) and the OECD average (12.7%). In countries such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy, the proportions were below 10%.

Proportion of low-paid workers in OECD countries; 2023



SOURCE OECD, *Earnings* (retrieved in Dec 2025)
NOTE Denmark and Switzerland used data of the year 2022.

Proportion of low-paid workers; 2001 – 2024



SOURCE OECD, *Earnings* (retrieved in Dec 2025)

Working Hours




DEFINITION Total working hours per month of wage earners
HOW TO MEASURE Prescribed work hours + Overtime hours worked

146.8 hours in 2024, down 10.8 hours from previous year

Given the increasing emphasis on work-life balance and changing attitudes towards work, working hours are an important factor affecting workers' quality of life and labour productivity. Earning sufficient income while working fewer hours allows people to enjoy more leisure time and can improve their quality of life. Long working hours are regarded as one of the main factors that diminish workers' quality of life.

Total monthly working hours in 2024 stood at 146.8 hours, down 10.8 hours from 157.6 hours in 2023. Working hours had generally declined from 193.4 hours in 2006. In 2015, they rose by 8.0 hours from the previous year to 173.5 hours, but subsequently resumed their downward trend. Following a slight rise in 2020 and 2021, working hours declined again to 146.8 hours in 2024, the lowest level since 2006. Working hours are typically affected by the number of working days during the survey period. In both 2020 and 2021, there were 22 working days in June. From 2022 onward, the number fell to around 20 days, reaching 19 days in 2024. Although working hours fluctuate with the number of working days, the overall trend has been downward.

Working hours; 2006 – 2024




SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 'Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type.'
NOTE Working hours as of June each year.

By gender, men worked 153.8 hours per month, 16.4 hours more than women (137.4 hours). By age group, those in their 30s recorded relatively long working hours, at 155.9 hours in 2024. By contrast, workers aged 29 and under, as well as those aged 60 and over, recorded relatively short working hours. Compared with 2023, working hours declined across all age groups.

By employment type, regular workers worked 162.2 hours per month in 2024, compared with 105.8 hours for non-regular workers, indicating a substantial gap.

Working hours by employment type & age group; 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 'Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type.'
NOTE Working hours as of June each year.

Job Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their current job out of wage earners
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their overall working conditions

38.3% in 2025, up 3.2%p from 2023


While the workers' average earnings and working hours provide the objective measures of working conditions, job satisfaction is a subjective indicator based on workers' self-reported satisfaction with their jobs. It first measures satisfaction with specific aspects of work, followed by overall job satisfaction to capture workers' subjective assessment of their working life.

According to the 'Social Survey' conducted by the Ministry of Data and Statistics(MODS), job satisfaction stood at 38.3% in 2025, up 3.2%p from 2023. This was the highest level since 2009. After showing little change from 26.6% in 2009 to 27.7% in 2017, job satisfaction has increased steadily in recent years.

By gender, the job satisfaction among men stood at 38.1% in 2025, slightly lower than among women (38.5%). Compared with 2023, the satisfaction increased for both men and women. By age group, workers aged 60 and over recorded the lowest job satisfaction at 32.8%, while those in their 20s recorded the highest at 41.0%. Differences across age groups were generally small, except for the relatively low level among workers aged 60 and over. Compared with


2023, job satisfaction increased across all age groups. Job satisfaction varied by occupation. It was the highest among 'Pro., Tech., Managers' at 50.3%, while 'clerks' also recorded relatively high satisfaction at 43.1%. By contrast, job satisfaction was lower among 'service & sales workers' and 'craft, operator, assemblers', with 32.6% and 27.8% respectively. This indicates visible differences in job satisfaction across occupations.

Job satisfaction; 2009 – 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey.'
NOTE ① The survey had been conducted on the population aged 15 and over until 2010, and has been done on those aged 13 and over since 2012. ② The survey covered wage earners who had worked for at least one hour during the previous week.

Job satisfaction by gender, age group & occupation; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey.'
NOTE The survey covered wage earners who had worked for at least one hour during the previous week.

Income·Consumption·Wealth




About

The income and wealth are major factors representing the material aspects of quality of life. Rather than directly determining the quality of life, however, they affect it through the consumption process. As a key indicator of available material resources, income influences quality of life through consumption activities and provides a basis for wealth accumulation. Income distribution indicates how income is distributed among members of society and serves as an important factor in determining 'societal quality,' although it is not directly related to individuals' quality of life.

Recent Trends

Among the seven indicators in the Income/Consumption/Wealth domain, five improved, while the remaining two deteriorated. Compared with the end of 2024 when six of the seven indicators improved and none deteriorated, overall conditions worsened. Indicators that had previously deteriorated, such as GNI per capita and household net wealth, improved in the latest period. Equivalised median income and consumption satisfaction also improved, while income satisfaction declined. The household debt ratio, which had consistently deteriorated, began to improve. Meanwhile, the relative poverty rate, which had remained broadly unchanged, increased compared with the previous year.



Gross National Income per Capita




DEFINITION Total sum of income of the people in a nation from participation in production activities during a certain period, divided by the total population
HOW TO MEASURE Gross National Income (Consumer Price Index applied) ÷ Total population

43.81 million KRW in 2024, up 3.5% from 2023

Gross domestic product (GDP) is useful for assessing the size of a national economy, but is limited in identifying the people's standards of living. Meanwhile, gross national income (GNI), which refers to the total income earned by residents of a country, can be used as a broad indicator of the economic foundations of well-being, as it directly affects consumption and welfare in a nation. GNI per capita, calculated by dividing total national income by the population, is one of the most representative indicators for comparing income levels across countries and over time. Since 2000, real GNI per capita, adjusted for changes in prices, had generally increased. Real GNI per capita stood at 43.81 million KRW in 2024, up 1.46 million KRW, or 3.5% from 42.35 million KRW in 2023.

GNI per capita had shown an overall upward trend since 2000, but its growth rate varied from year to year. It declined by 0.4% in 2008, while annual growth generally remained between 2% and 6% from 2011. The growth rate slowed from 2017 onward. Real GNI per capita remained broadly unchanged in 2019 and 2020, before declining by 0.3% in 2022 compared with the previous year. It subsequently resumed its upward trend.



SOURCE Bank of Korea, ¹National Accounts₁; Ministry of Data and Statistics, ¹Population Projections₁ (as of 2022)
NOTE ① The real gross national income was calculated using the annual average price index (the year of 2020 = 100). ② The data was based on National Accounts revised as of 2020. ③ The figures in 2023 and 2024 were tentative.

Equivalised Median Income



DEFINITION A median amount of household income divided by the number of household members
HOW TO MEASURE Equivalised disposable income of sample households, divided by the number of household members (Consumer Price Index applied)

34.44 million KRW in 2024, up 770,000 KRW from 2023

As an indicator of household income, equivalised median income reflects the standard of living of households at the middle of income distribution. It not only indicates the median level of individual income in Korea but also serves as a fundamental measure used to calculate income distribution indicators such as the Gini coefficient, the relative poverty rate and the proportion of middle-income households. As household size varies, the number of household members needs to be taken into account when comparing income levels across households. Equivalised income refers to household income adjusted by dividing it by the square root of the household size.


Adjusted with the Consumer Price Index with 2020 as the base year, real equivalised median income stood at 34.44 million KRW in 2024, up 770,000 KRW from 33.67 million KRW in 2023. It rose by 48.3% from 23.23 million KRW in 2011 to 34.44 million KRW in 2024. Despite some variations in growth rate, equivalised median income has consistently increased since 2011.

Equivalised median income stood at 37.62 million KRW for the working-age group and 21.90 million KRW for the retirement-age group, indicating a substantial gap between the two groups. Income for the working-age group increased by 48.7%, from 25.30 million KRW in 2011 to 37.62 million KRW in 2024. Meanwhile, income for the retirement-age group increased by 80.0%, from 12.16 million KRW to 21.90 million KRW over the same period. In 2011, income for the working-age group was more than twice that for the retirement-age group, but the ratio gradually declined to around 1.7 in 2024.

MEDIAN INCOME


Income level at the midpoint of all households in Korea ranked by their incomes

Equivalised median income(real); 2011 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions'; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Consumer Price Index'
NOTE ① This is equivalised annual income. ② These are real amounts based on disposable income (the year of 2020 = 100).

Equivalised median income by age group(real); 2011 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions'; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Consumer Price Index'
NOTE ① This is equivalised annual income. ② These are real amounts based on disposable income (the year of 2020 = 100). ③ Working age group: 18-65; retirement age group: 66 and over.

Income Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their income
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied as "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their income, out of the population with income


28.0% in 2025, down 0.1%p from 2023

In addition to objective income levels, this indicator measures individuals' subjective satisfaction with their income. It is a crucial indicator of how individuals assess their material standard of living. Even among individuals with similar income levels, satisfaction with income may vary. Despite rising income levels, income satisfaction in Korea has remained relatively low.

According to the 'Social Survey' conducted by MODS, the proportion of people satisfied with their income was 28.0% in 2025. This means around three in ten people were satisfied with their income. Income satisfaction rose from 11.9% in 2003 to 14.1% in 2009, and then fluctuated between 10% and 14%, before rising sharply to 23.5% in 2021. In 2025, it declined by 0.1%p from 2023, remaining broadly unchanged. However, the proportion dissatisfied with their income fell by 2.2%p from 39.8% in 2023 to 37.6% in 2025, while the proportion who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied increased by 2.4%p from 32.0% to 34.4%. By gender, income satisfaction was slightly higher among men at 29.1% than among women at 26.6%.

By age group, income satisfaction was highest among those in their 40s, at 31.2%, and lowest among those aged 60 and over, at 23.1%. The gap between the two groups was 8.1%p. Compared with 2023, income satisfaction increased among those in their 30s, 40s and 50s, while it declined by 2.5%p among those aged 60 and over, widening differences across age groups.

Income satisfaction; 2003 – 2025




SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2009 and those aged 19 and over from 2011 onwards.

Income satisfaction; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'
NOTE The survey covered the population aged 19 and over

Income satisfaction by age group; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'

Consumption Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their consumption life

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall consumption life(overall consumption of clothing, food, housing, leisure and hobbies, etc.)

24.6% in 2025, up 3.4%p from 2023


Consumption satisfaction measures people’s subjective perceptions of their spending and consumption. Separate from the objective level of consumption, it indicates how satisfied people are with their consumption and reflects their self-assessed material standards of living.

The proportion of people who were satisfied with their consumption life, measured by MODS 「Social Survey」, stood at 24.6% in 2025, up 3.4%p from 21.2% in 2023. After some fluctuations between 11.2% in 2003 and 13.9% in 2015, consumption satisfaction has gradually increased. Until 2019, it was generally slightly higher than income satisfaction, but this pattern was reversed in 2021 when income satisfaction sharply increased. In 2025, a relatively high proportion of respondents, at 49.4%, were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with consumption, compared with 34.4% for income. The proportion dissatisfied with consumption was 26.0%, 11.6%p lower than with the proportion dissatisfied with income (37.6%). It also declined by 2.9%p from 28.9% in 2023.

By gender, consumption satisfaction was slightly higher among men, at 25.1%, than among women, at 24.0%, although the difference was small.

By age group, consumption satisfaction was highest among those aged 19–29, at 31.5%. It generally declined with age, in contrast to income satisfaction. However, differences across age groups were not very pronounced, except among those aged 60 and over, whose satisfaction was relatively low at 19.9%. Compared with 2023, satisfaction levels increased across all age groups, particularly among those aged 19 to 29, for whom it rose by 5.5%p. On the other hand, the increase among those in their 40s was relatively small, at 1.7%p.


Consumption satisfaction; 2003 – 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2009 and those aged 19 and over from 2011 onwards.


Consumption satisfaction; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

NOTE The survey covered the population aged 19 and over.

Consumption satisfaction by age group; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

Household Net Wealth



DEFINITION Average assets of all households minus the average debts

HOW TO MEASURE Average net wealth of all households (real value with the consumer price index applied) = Average assets of all households - Average debts of all households

404.29 million KRW in 2025, up 11.10 million KRW from 2024

Household net wealth refers to the total value of a household’s assets minus its debts and indicates the amount of accumulated wealth which serves as a foundation for sustainable well-being. It is important to examine changes in household wealth and trends in its components for assessing changes in people’s financial conditions. As household finances affect consumption, examining them also enables assessment of their impact on the macro-economy.


In 2025, household net wealth in real terms, calculated by subtracting debts from assets, amounted to 404.29 million KRW, up 11.10 million KRW from 393.19 million KRW in 2024. It had generally shown an upward trend since 2011, except in 2013-2014. However, it declined by 33.16 million KRW in 2023 compared with the previous year. Despite increases in both 2024 and 2025, it had not yet recovered to its 2022 level.

Compared with 2024, nominal household net wealth increased in all income quintiles except the first quintile. In the fifth quintile, net wealth increased by 81.13 million KRW, while the first quintile was the only group to record a decline, falling by 7.30 million KRW, or 4.9%.

By age group of the household head, nominal household net wealth in 2025 was highest among those in their 50s, at 551.61 million KRW, followed by those aged 60 and over, at 535.91 million KRW. Household heads in their 50s also recorded the highest level of assets, at 662.05 million KRW. Debts were lowest among those aged 60 and over, at 65.04 million KRW, and highest among those in their 40s, at 143.25 million KRW.

By region, nominal household net wealth in the national capital areas stood at 588.32 million KRW in 2025, compared with 357.20 million KRW in other areas, indicating a regional disparity.

Household net wealth(real); 2011 – 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Consumer Price Index」


NOTE ① The household net wealth was a real value by applying the consumer price index(2020=100). ② From 2017 onward, all loans from individuals and workplaces have been included in credit loans.

Net wealth by income quintile(nominal); 2024, 2025

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
2024	14,974	23,742	33,722	48,767	103,252
2025	14,244	24,529	34,456	51,066	111,365

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」

Household net wealth by age group & region(nominal); 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」

NOTE Assets, debt, and net wealth are estimated as of the end of March of the survey year.

Household Debt Ratio



DEFINITION A ratio of total household debts to disposable household income
HOW TO MEASURE (Total household debts ÷ Disposable household income) × 100

186.2% in 2023, down 5.2%p from 2022

Household debt can serve as a means of financing housing and living expenses. However, when debt exceeds a certain level, it can place a burden on both households and the national economy. An increase in household debt raises the burden of principal and interest repayments, thereby increasing households’ financial risks and constraining spending and consumption.


The ratio of household debt to disposable income in Korea generally increased from 130.4% in 2008 to 186.2% in 2023. This indicates an increase in the share of disposable income to repay principal and interest. With variations in annual changes, the ratio usually rose by 3-4%p per year. The increase was particularly large in 2016, at 10.8%p from the previous year. It also rose by 9.1%p in 2020 and by 11.5%p in 2021. However, the ratio declined by 3.0%p to 191.4% in 2022 and fell by a further 5.2%p in 2023.

In comparison with other OECD countries, Korea had a relatively high ratio of household debt to disposable income. In countries such as the United States (103.3%), Japan (124.0%), France (115.8%) and the United Kingdom (130.7%), the ratio remained below 150%. Meanwhile, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway recorded ratios above 200%.



SOURCE OECD, National Accounts at a Glance (retrieved in Jan 2026)

Household debt ratio of OECD countries; 2024



SOURCE OECD, National Accounts at a Glance (retrieved in Jan 2026)

NOTE The 2022 data for Norway, and the 2023 data for Australia, Chile, Colombia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Switzerland, and the US were used.

Relative Poverty Rate




DEFINITION A proportion of the population receiving no more than 50% of the equivalised median income
HOW TO MEASURE (Population with no more than 50% of the median disposable income ÷ Total population) × 100

15.3% in 2024, up 0.4%p from previous year

The relative poverty rate is one of the key indicators to measure income inequality and assess societal quality. It represents the proportion of the low-income population in society. The rate is defined as the proportion of people with an equivalised disposable income below 50% of the median and indicates the size of the population living in relative poverty.

The relative poverty rate in 2024 stood at 15.3%, up 0.4%p from the previous year. The relative poverty rate had been on a downward trend from 18.5% in 2011, but remained stagnant at below 15% from 2021 to 2023 before increasing slightly in 2024.

Accordng to OECD data for 2023, the relative poverty rate(14.9%) in Korea was relatively high among OECD countries. It was lower than that of Japan(15.4%) but higher than in Australia(12.6%), the United Kingdom(12.6%), Germany(11.6%) and France(8.7%). Among people aged 66 and over, Korea’s relative poverty rate was 39.7%, noticeably higher than most other OECD countries. Apart from Korea, only Latvia(34.3%) and New Zealand(33.7%) recorded rates above 30% for this age group. This also



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions

NOTE ① These are based on disposable income. ② For time-series comparison with income-related items around 2021, note that since 2021, administrative data has been utilised for estimation of insurance coverage in transfer income.

implies a wider gap in the relative poverty rates between older people and other age groups in Korea than in many other countries.

Relative poverty rates of OECD countries; 2023



SOURCE OECD, Income Distribution Database (retrieved in Jan 2026)

NOTE ① These are based on disposable income. ②The 2019 data for Iceland; the 2020 for Australia; the 2021 data for Japan; and the 2022 data for Chile, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Türkiye were used.




About

In contrast to working hours, leisure time refers to the hours that individuals can freely use. Healthy engagement in leisure activities, including physical activities such as sports and mental activities such as cultural and artistic activities, can help relieve stress arising from work or other aspects of social life. In addition, as both sports and cultural/artistic activities provide opportunities to socialise with others, they contribute to promoting relationships with family and community members and also provide opportunities for self-reflection. In particular, cultural and artistic activities can enrich people's minds and facilitate participants to develop their own cultural identities enabling them to regain vitality in their lives.

Recent Trends

Among the six indicators in the Leisure domain, five improved while the remaining one was deteriorated. As the indicators were heavily affected during the COVID-19 pandemic, most indicators in this domain have been recovering from the sharp deterioration in 2020. However, unlike the other indicators, leisure time, which steadily increased even during the pandemic, declined in both 2022 and 2023 before increasing again in 2024. Sufficiency of leisure time has increased each year since 2020. Travel days per person and participation in culture, art and sport event increased somewhat after the sharp deterioration caused by COVID-19 but have yet to recover to their pre-COVID-19 levels. The ratio of expenditure on leisure and leisure satisfaction have improved consistently.



Ratio of Expenditure on Leisure





DEFINITION A proportion of spending on cultural or leisure activities out of household expenditures
HOW TO MEASURE (Monthly average of leisure/cultural/information-related expenditures ÷ Monthly average of household expenditures) × 100

5.50% in 2024, up 0.23%p from previous year

Household expenditure on leisure activities indicates the extent to which people use economic resources for leisure. Calculating the ratio of expenditure on leisure to total household expenditure enables an estimation of the level of economic resources used for leisure activities. In addition, this indicator can serve as a basic measure of quality of life since expenditure on leisure activities is used to purchase goods and services needed for such activities. The ratio of expenditure on leisure to total household expenditure in 2024 stood at 5.50%, combining expenditure on recreation and culture (177,660 KRW) and on information-related services (38,510 KRW) under information and communication. The ratio of expenditure on leisure increased from 4.16% in 2006 to 5.76% in 2018, before declining during the COVID-19 pandemic. From 2022 onward, it increased consistently again. Expenditure on leisure also declined from 180,000 KRW in 2019 to 139,000 KRW in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, before rising consistently again. Expenditure on recreation and culture declined from 145,000 KRW in 2019 to 96,000 KRW in 2020, while expenditure on information-related services

increased from 36,000 KRW to 43,000 KRW during the same period. The ratio of expenditure on leisure tends to be higher among households with younger household heads. It was highest at 6.67% among households headed by persons aged under 40 and lowest at 4.73% among those headed by persons aged 60 and over. Compared with 2023, the ratio increased across all age groups.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ¹Household Income & Expenditure Survey₁
NOTE ① This is based on households (single-person or more) nationwide. Agricultural households were excluded until 2016 but have been included since 2017. ② This is based on nominal figures. ③ Caution is required when interpreting time-series data as the survey methods and sampling design were modified twice in 2017 and 2019.

Leisure Time



DEFINITION Average daily leisure time, including weekdays and weekends

HOW TO MEASURE $\{(Leisure\ time\ on\ weekdays \times 5\ days) + (Leisure\ time\ on\ weekends \times 2\ days)\} \div 7\ days$

4.3 hours in 2024, up 0.2 hours from 2023


Leisure time refers to the number of hours that can be used freely excluding time spent on required activities such as work, household chores and classes. It is a basic indicator of quality of life in terms of work-life balance and provides a foundation for leisure activities. An appropriate amount of leisure time helps address problems arising from a work-oriented society and is meaningful as a prerequisite for enjoying abundant leisure activities. As one of the most fundamental requirements for leisure life, leisure time provides the basic information on the people's leisure life.

The Leisure Activity Research conducted by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism collects self-reported information on leisure time on weekdays and weekends. According to this survey, leisure time in 2024 stood at 3.7 hours on weekdays and 5.7 hours on weekends. Combining these two, average daily leisure time was 4.3 hours per day. Leisure time increased from 3.8 hours in 2006 to 4.9 hours in 2010 and fluctuated at around 4 hours until 2018. Since 2019, it has remained at 4 hours and above.

Leisure time was the same for men and women at 4.3 hours. By day of the week, women had 0.2 hours more leisure time than men on weekdays, at 3.8 hours, while men had more leisure time than women on weekends, at 5.9 hours compared with 5.5 hours.

By age group, older people tended to have more leisure time, with 4.4 hours among those in their 60s and 5.5 hours among those aged 70 and over. Among respondents aged under 60, those in their 20s had relatively long leisure time, at 4.3 hours. Compared with 2023, leisure time remained at a similar level or changed slightly by 0.1-0.2 hours.


Leisure time; 2006 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」


NOTE The survey covered people aged 10 and over until 2008 and those aged 15 and over from 2010 onwards.

Leisure time by gender; 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」

Leisure time by age group; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」

Sufficiency of Leisure Time



DEFINITION A proportion of the respondents who regard their leisure time as sufficient

HOW TO MEASURE $(Leisure\ time\ satisfaction\ during\ weekdays + Leisure\ time\ satisfaction\ during\ weekends) \div 2$

65.1% in 2024, up 1.7%p from previous year


Leisure time is important for people's leisure activities and quality of life. More leisure time is expected to increase leisure activities and enhance quality of life. Unlike the amount of leisure time which is objective, whether the available leisure time is sufficient is determined only through individuals' subjective assessments. Sufficiency of leisure time reflects individuals' time resources for leisure as well as rest in daily life.

The proportion of respondents who perceived that they had enough leisure time was 65.1% in 2024, up 1.7%p from 63.4% in 2023. It had been on a downward trend, including a decline from 66.2% in 2014 to 60.1% in 2016, before beginning to increase in 2022. Given the increase in leisure time since 2016, it suggests a disparity between objective leisure time and subjective assessment of its sufficiency. However, when weekdays and weekends were compared, people perceived leisure to be more sufficient on weekends at 71.8% than on weekdays at 58.3%, showing the same pattern as the amount of leisure time.

By gender, 65.6% of men reported having sufficient leisure time, 1.0%p higher than the proportion of women (64.6%). The sufficiency of leisure time varies by age group. In general, it is lower among those aged 15 to 19, 30 to 49 and higher among those in their 20s and those aged 60 and over.

In 2024, sufficiency of leisure time was lowest among those aged 15 to 19 at 53.9%, followed by those in their 40s at 58.8%. Meanwhile, it stood at 79.3% among those aged 70 and over and at 69.8% for those in their 60s. Age-specific differences in the sufficiency of leisure time showed almost the same pattern as those in objective leisure time. Compared with 2023, the proportion among respondents aged 15 to 19 declined by 2.8%p, the largest change among all age groups.


Sufficiency of leisure time; 2014 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」

NOTE ① The sufficiency of leisure time refers to the average of sufficiency in weekdays and weekends. ② The survey covers the population aged 15 and over.

Sufficiency of leisure time by gender & age group; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」

NOTE The sufficiency of leisure time refers to the average of sufficiency in weekdays and weekends.

Participation in Culture, Art and Sport Event



DEFINITION Average number of per-capita participations in cultural, artistic and sports events

HOW TO MEASURE Average number of people paying a visit to a music concert, music festival, play, traditional Korean performance, musical, dance performance, movies, museum, art gallery and sports events

7.1 times in 2025, up 0.1 times from 2023

This indicator shows the extent of active participation in leisure activities, and participation in culture, art and sports activities affects quality of life in various ways. At the individual level, it can satisfy individuals' desire for self-expression, while at the social level, it can help strengthen communities.


Participation in cultural, art and sports events increased from 2004, when participation rate was 51.0% and the average number of attendance was 7.1 times, to 2013. Afterward, the attendance rate and frequency fluctuated slightly and remained stagnant. However, the number of attendances to cultural, art and sports events declined sharply in 2021, as social distancing measured related to COVID-19 affected cultural and art activities and leisure life. The proportion of people who had attended an art performance, movie, museum, art gallery or sports over the past year was equal to 24.1% in 2021, with the per-capita attendance frequency of 4.5 times on average. Compared with 2019, the attendance rate decreased more than half from 66.2% in 2019, and the number of per-capita visits also reduced almost by half (8.4 times in 2019). In 2025, the attendance rate and per-capita frequency had considerably increased to 57.7% and 7.1 times respectively. Despite such this recovery, both were yet to meet the pre-COVID-19 level.

By gender, men attended these events 7.0 times while women attended 7.2 times. This was consistent with the previous pattern in which women had participated in these events more often than men.

By age group, those in their 20s recorded the highest attendance frequency at 8.6 times. Attendance became less frequent with older age. Among those aged 60 and over, the frequency was 5.9 times. Compared with 2023, attendance frequency increased overall, except among

those aged 13 to 19, whose frequency declined from 7.8 times in 2023 to 7.6 times in 2025.


Participation in culture, art and sport event; 2004 - 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'

NOTE ① The number of visits refers to the average number of per-capita participation over the past 12 months. ② The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2009 and those aged 13 and over from 2011 onwards. ③ An item 'Literacy events' was added in 2023.

Participation in culture, art and sport event by gender & age group; 2023, 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'

NOTE ① The number of visits refers to the average number of per-capita participation over the past 12 months. ② An item 'Literacy events' was added in 2023.

Travel Days per Person



DEFINITION No. of domestic travel days per person on an annual basis

HOW TO MEASURE No. of domestic travel days (incl. day trips) per person of the population aged 15 and over

8.54 days in 2024, down 0.41 days from previous year

With growing interest in leisure, the number of travellers is increasing as well. Travel is both one of the most preferred leisure activities and the activity people most want to pursue in the future. Travel days per person are an indicator of the extent to which people engage in leisure activities.


Among the population aged 15 and over, travel days per person in Korea stood at 8.54 days in 2024, down 0.41 days from 8.95 days in 2023. It generally increased from 2020 when the number of travel days sharply fell due to the restrictions on both international and domestic travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the decline in 2024, it had not yet recovered to the pre-COVID-19 level of 10.01 days in 2019. The domestic tourism experience rate increased from 75.5% in 2020 to 91.3% in 2024, exceeding the pre-COVID-19 level of 85.0%. In addition, the international travel experience rate also increased by 6.2%p to 22.1% in 2024, nearly reaching the pre-COVID-19 level of 23.2% in 2019. It indicates the travel experience rate had largely recovered to pre-COVID-19 levels unlike the number of domestic travel days.

For the number of domestic tourist travel days, those in their 30s recorded the highest figure at 10.92 days, followed by those in their 40s, at more than 10 days. In contrast,

those aged 70 and over had the fewest at 4.09 days. Compared with 2023, the number of travel days decreased across all age groups except those aged 60 and over.

By household income, the number of domestic tourist travel days per person increased with household income, reaching 10.04 days among households earning 6 million KRW or more. Notably, the figure was lower among low-income households, at 3.70 days for those earning less than 1 million KRW and 4.36 days for those earning between 1 million KRW and 2 million KRW. Compared with 2023, the number of travel days declined across all income levels, particularly sharply among households earning 6 million KRW or more.


Travel days per person; 2018 - 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 'Korea National Tourism Survey'

NOTE ① Domestic travel means traveling for the purpose of leisure, recreation and vacation out of all trips that have been to other jurisdictions outside the corresponding administrative district. ② This is based on estimated population aged 15 and over as of December each year (population projections, as of 2020).

Travel days per person by age group & household income; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 'Korea National Tourism Survey'

NOTE ① Domestic travel means traveling for the purpose of leisure, recreation and vacation out of all trips that have been to other jurisdictions outside the corresponding administrative district. ② This is based on estimated population aged 15 and over as of December each year (population projections, as of 2020).

Leisure Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with current leisure activities
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their leisure activities among those surveyed

39.4% in 2025, up 5.1%p from 2023


Leisure satisfaction indicates subjective satisfaction level of individuals with their leisure activities. Some studies suggest leisure life is one of the crucial components of quality of life. Leisure satisfaction is also meaningful as a composite indicator that summarises various aspects of life, as engagement in appropriate leisure activities requires individuals to be in good physical and financial condition. The proportion of people satisfied with their leisure life increased from 21.8% in 2009 to 27.1% in 2013. Since then, the proportion had remained generally stable. In 2021, when the other indicators related to leisure were rapidly deteriorated due to COVID-19, the decline in leisure satisfaction was relatively small, at only 1.8%p from 2019. In 2025, the leisure satisfaction stood at 39.4%, up 5.1%p from 2023 and the highest level since 2009.

Satisfaction was slightly higher among men (40.2%) than women (38.5%). Leisure satisfaction tended to decline with age. About 53.0% of teenagers aged 13 to 19 were satisfied with leisure life, while the proportion fell to only 30.1% among those aged 60 and over. This age gap in leisure satisfaction corresponded with participation in cultural, art and sports events. While older people tended to have more leisure time, their participation in active leisure activities, such as attendance in cultural, art or sport events, was very low, thereby resulting in low satisfaction with their leisure life.

Compared with 2023, leisure satisfaction among those aged 20 and over rose by 5%p or more while satisfaction among those aged 13 to 19, which was the highest among all groups in 2025, rose by 2.7%p, a smaller increase than those among the other age groups.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2009 and those aged 13 and over from 2011 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

07 Housing




About

Housing refers to residential services that people use in their living space. Strictly speaking, it should be regarded as a type of consumption. Thus, it would be logical to include housing in the domain of Consumption, Income and Wealth. However, the ability to secure adequate housing services, as well as housing stability and size, can be crucial to quality of life in Korea. Housing has therefore been designated as a separate domain.

Recent Trends

Among the six indicators in the Housing domain, three improved, one deteriorated, and two remained unchanged from the previous period. Home-ownership rate, which had remained stagnant at around 58.0% since 2017, improved slightly in 2024. Rent to income ratio and residential area per capita remained unchanged from the previous year. Dwelling without basic facilities had been on a continuous downward trend until 2023 but slightly deteriorated in 2024. Housing environment satisfaction has been on an upward trend, with a further increase in 2024.



Home-ownership Rate



DEFINITION A ratio of households living in their own homes out of total households
HOW TO MEASURE (households occupying in owned home ÷ Total general households) × 100

58.4% in 2024, up 1.0%p from previous year



Despite a noticeable increase in the housing supply rate resulting from the steady expansion of housing supply, the home-ownership rate in Korea has remained relatively low. As housing is one of the basic necessities of life, and home ownership is particularly significant in Korean society beyond simply providing a place to live, it has an enormous impact on quality of life.

The proportion of households living in their own homes, i.e. home-ownership rate, decreased from 55.6% in 2006 to 53.6% in 2014 then increased to 58.0% in 2019. Since then, it had remained stagnant. In 2024, it stood at 58.4%, an increase of 1.0%p from the previous year.

By region, Seoul recorded the lowest rate in 2024, at 44.1%, followed by Daejeon at 53.1%. Gyeonggi-do, Jeju and Sejong also recorded rates below 60%, indicating relatively low levels. Notably, Seoul’s rate was approximately 9%p lower than that of Daejeon, which already had the second-lowest rate, and was therefore considerably lower than those of the other regions. Meanwhile, Jeollanam-do had

the highest rate, at 72.1%, followed by Gyeongsangbuk-do at 69.5%.

Compared with 2023, home-ownership rates increased in all regions. However, the rate in Seoul increased by only 0.1%p and remained almost unchanged from the previous year. In most regions, the rate increased by about 1.0%p. In particular, Jeollanam-do’s rate increased by 1.6%p from 2023, representing a relatively large increase.



Rent to Income Ratio




DEFINITION A ratio of housing rents to monthly income
HOW TO MEASURE (Monthly median rent ÷ Monthly median household income) × 100

15.8% in 2024, unchanged from previous year


Housing rent accounts for a large proportion of household expenditures. It is one of the most burdensome expenses for households that do not own their homes. The RIR (rent-to-income ratio) is a representative indicator that measures housing costs relative to income. An RIR above 25% is considered somewhat burdensome, while an RIR above 30% is considered highly burdensome. The RIR stood at 15.8% in 2024, the same as in 2023. After increasing from 18.7% in 2006 to 20.3% in 2014, it generally declined from 2014 onward. Since 2018, it has remained between 15% and 16%.

By region, the RIR was 18.4% in the national capital area, 15.2% in metropolitan cities and 12.7% in provincial areas, indicating that the national capital area had a higher RIR than the other areas. Compared with 2023, the RIR decreased by 0.1%p in metropolitan cities and by 0.3%p in provincial areas. In the national capital area, it declined by 1.9%p, a relatively large decrease. The RIR in the national capital area had increased by 2.0%p from 2022 to 20.3% in 2023, but in 2024 it returned to a level similar to that recorded in 2022. In metropolitan cities, it remained at

around 15% following a decline in 2010. The regional gap had narrowed since 2012, except in 2023. In 2024, the gap returned to its 2022 level. By household income, the RIR was higher among both lower-income and upper-income groups, while the middle-income group had a relatively lower RIR. Compared with 2023, the RIR declined by 1.5%p among the lower-income group and by 0.6%p among the middle-income group. Meanwhile, the rate increased from 18.7% in 2023 to 19.4% in 2024 among the upper-income group.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
NOTE The income level is divided into low (1 to 4 deciles), middle (5 to 8 deciles) and high (9 to 10 deciles) ranks based on 10 deciles of household income.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
NOTE The national capital areas include Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi.

Residential Area per Capita



DEFINITION Residential area per household member
HOW TO MEASURE Average of (residential area of individual household ÷ No. of household members)


36.0m² in 2024, unchanged from 2023

Residential area per capita is a key indicator of housing quality, showing whether people live in housing of an adequate size. This indicator is also used to estimate the number of households living in dwelling without basic facilities. Given rapid changes in household structure, such as the increasing number of single-person households, residential area per capita more appropriately reflects housing conditions and quality in Korea. It is also widely used in international comparisons.


After increasing from 26.2m² in 2006 to 33.5m² in 2014 and then declining slightly, residential area per capita began to increase again in recent years. It stood at 36.0m² in 2024, the same as in 2023. In 2024, it was 9.8m² higher than in 2006.

By region, residential area per capita was 33.0m² in the national capital area, 36.7m² in metropolitan cities and 40.2m² in provincial areas, indicating that it was larger in provincial areas than in the national capital area. Compared with 2023, the average residential area increased in metropolitan cities and provincial areas, while it declined in the national capital area, widening the regional gap.

By income level, residential area per capita was largest for the low-income group, at 41.5m², while it was relatively similar for the middle- and upper-income groups, at 32.6m² and 30.1m², respectively. This phenomenon can be seen as the result of a combination of structural factors, including the high proportion of small households among lower-income groups, residence outside the national capital area and long-term residence in owner-occupied housing. Residential area per household was 88.5m² for the high-income group, indicating distinct differences across income levels.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
NOTE The income level is divided into low (1 to 4 deciles), middle (5 to 8 deciles) and high (9 to 10 deciles) ranks based on 10 deciles of household income.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
NOTE ① The national capital areas include Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi. ② The multi-unit housing area has been estimated based on administrative data since 2017.

Dwelling without Basic Facilities



DEFINITION A proportion of households dwelling below the minimum housing standards out of total households
HOW TO MEASURE (Number of households dwelling below the minimum housing standards ÷ Total number of households) × 100

3.8% in 2024, up 0.2%p from previous year

Housing is one of the most crucial aspects of maintaining an individual's livelihood. While residential area per capita reflects the quantitative aspect of housing, the proportion of dwellings without basic facilities serves as an indicator of housing quality through the incorporation of various criteria beyond size. This indicator helps assess the size of the population vulnerable to inadequate housing conditions.

In 2024, the proportion of dwelling without basic facilities was 3.8%, up 0.2%p from 3.6% in 2023. This proportion considerably declined from 16.6% in 2006 and remained in the 5% range from 2014. Then, it fell to 4.6% in 2020 and remained below 4% from 2022 onward.

By region, the proportion was relatively high in the national capital area at 4.4%, while metropolitan cities recorded the lowest proportion at 2.8%. In the national capital area, it fell from 12.8% in 2006 to 4.4% in 2024. Over the same period, metropolitan cities saw a decline from 17.7% to 2.8%, while provincial areas saw a decline from 21.6% to 3.4%, indicating an improvement in housing conditions outside the national capital area. The proportion in the national capital area declined to 4.7% in 2014 but subsequently increased and remained stagnant, while metropolitan cities and provincial areas showed steady improvement. Compared with 2023, the proportion increased in all regions.

By individual criteria of the minimum housing standards, the national capital area had the highest proportion of households failing to meet the space standard, at 3.89%. By contrast, provincial areas performed relatively well in terms of space but had the highest proportion of households failing to meet the facility standards, at 2.8%. These figures highlight distinct regional differences in housing conditions.

MINIMUM HOUSING STANDARDS
(Notice of Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs on 27 May 2011)


Facilities In the case there is an absence of at least one of the following facilities: a dedicated stand-up kitchen, a dedicated flush toilet, and a dedicated bathing facility

Bedroom and Area single-person(1 room & 14㎡), 2-person(1 room & 26㎡), 3-person(2 rooms & 36㎡), 4-person(3 rooms & 43㎡), 5-person(3 rooms & 46㎡), 6-person(4 rooms & 55㎡)

Dwelling without basic facilities by standard; 2024

	BELOW AREA STANDARD	BELOW FACILITY STANDARD	BELOW BEDROOM STANDARD
Capital Areas	3.8	2.4	0.1
Metropolitan Cities	1.9	1.8	0.1
Provinces	2.2	2.8	0.2

SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
NOTE The national capital areas include Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi.



Commuting Time to Office



DEFINITION Average time required for commuters to get to work from home
HOW TO MEASURE Average time required to get to work from home out of the population aged 12 and over




30.8 minutes in 2020, down 0.4 minutes from 2015

Commuting time is an indicator of workers' access to their workplace and reflects the spatial relationship between their place of residence and workplace. As commuting is regular and repetitive, it is an important factor in residential location choice, as shorter commuting times may involve trade-offs with housing quality. Trends in commuting time provide a direct and indirect indication of changes in the distance between workplaces and places of residence, as well as changes in urban spatial structure. Commuting time tends to increase inevitably as urban growth and rising housing prices constrain residential location choices.

The average commuting time in Korea stood at 30.8 minutes in 2020, up 2.4 minutes from 28.4 minutes in 2000. The proportion of people commuting to work for one hour or longer increased from 14.5% in 2000 to 18.0% in 2015, before falling to 15.3% in 2020. The proportion commuting for 90 minutes or longer increased from 3.8% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2020.

By region, people living in Dong areas had longer commuting times, while those living in Myeon areas had the shortest commuting times. In Dong areas, the proportion commuting

for 60 minutes or longer was 17.2%, considerably higher than the corresponding proportions of 8.2% in Eup areas and 4.7% in Myeon areas. In addition, the proportion commuting for less than 15 minutes was only 17.9% in Dong areas, compared with 35.1% in Eup areas and 47.3% in Myeon areas.



Housing Environment Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with overall housing environments in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with overall housing environments regarding their residential areas


88.8% in 2024, up 0.9%p from 2023

In choosing a place to live, the residential environment is an important factor in addition to the dwelling itself, and housing quality can also be affected by the residential environment of the area. Housing environment satisfaction is an indicator of housing quality based on residents’ subjective assessments of the adequacy of their housing environment. Surveys of housing environment satisfaction, which widely cover satisfaction with the surrounding environment, help identify the functions and facilities needed by different groups of residents, such as by income level and age.


Housing environment satisfaction slightly increased by 0.9%p, from 87.9% in 2023 to 88.8% in 2024. After increasing from 73.7% in 2008 to 86.2% in 2017, it remained stagnant at between 85% and 86%.

By region, Daejeon recorded the highest satisfaction rate at 97.2%, followed by Sejong and Gwangju, both at around 95%. On the other hand, Incheon recorded the lowest rate, at 81.4%, while the rates in Busan and Gyeongsangbuk-do

were also relatively low, at below 85%. Compared with 2023, the largest increases were recorded in Jeollanam-do, at 5.6%p, and Jeollabuk-do, at 4.4%p. Meanwhile, satisfaction declined in Busan by 2.7%p, in Gangwon-do by 1.3%p and in Chungcheongbuk-do by 1.2%p.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, ‘Korea Housing Survey’
NOTE The figures in 2012 were excluded because a scale of 1 to 5 was used during the year.



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, ‘Korea Housing Survey’




About

The environment affects the quality of life of people in an immediate way. First, it has both direct impacts, such as air and water pollution, and indirect impacts, such as climate change, on human health. Second, people benefit from environmental services such as water and natural environments. Furthermore, people’s environmental rights, including access to environmental information, have gradually become more widely recognised. Third, people consider environmental amenities and disamenities to be crucial factors influencing their actual decisions, such as where to live. Finally, environmental conditions can cause natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, and climate change can increase the risk and severity of such disasters, affecting human lives and wealth.


Recent Trends

Among the nine indicators in the Environment domain, five improved compared with the previous period while the remaining four deteriorated. The waterworks supply rate in rural areas and urban park area per capita continued their upward trends, with both improving from the previous year. Fine particulate matter concentration has generally followed an improving trend since a marked decline during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, with a further slight decrease in 2024. Among the satisfaction indicators for different environmental aspects, satisfaction with air quality and noise levels continued to improve. By contrast, satisfaction with water quality, soil quality and the green environment deteriorated slightly compared with 2022. However, changes in all five environmental satisfaction indicators were small, at approximately 1%p.


Urban Park Area per Capita 🟢




Fine Dust Concentration Level 🟢




Waterworks Supply Rate in Rural Area 🟢




Air Quality Satisfaction 🟢




Water Quality Satisfaction 🟡




Soil Quality Satisfaction 🟡




Noise Level Satisfaction 🟢



Green Environment Satisfaction 🟡



Climate Change Recognition 🟡



Urban Park Area per Capita



DEFINITION Urban park area per citizen

HOW TO MEASURE Area of urban parks developed (Designated area-Undeveloped area) ÷ Total population in urban areas

12.8m² per capita in 2024, up 0.2m² from previous year


An urban park is a spatial facility established to protect natural scenery and promote the healthy, recreational and emotional well-being of urban residents. The availability of urban park services, including natural scenery and park facilities such as exercise and rest facilities, is an important factor in the quality of life of urban residents. Easily accessible urban parks in residential areas can make a substantial difference to quality of life and leisure activities.

Urban park area per capita rose by 0.2m² from 12.6m² in 2023 to 12.8m² in 2024. It increased from 5.3m² in 2001 to 10.3m² in 2008. After a decline to 8.1m² in 2009, it remained at around 8m² until 2015. It has since increased steadily, entering the 9 m² range in 2016.

The area of urban parks actually developed more than doubled from 219km² in 2002 to 605km² in 2024. Over the same period, green areas, which are established to conserve or improve natural environments and prevent pollution or disasters, expanded from 99km² to 211km², growing in tandem with urban parks. By contrast, the area of amusement parks, which serve as entertainment and recreational facilities for residents, declined consistently from 130km² to 115km² over the same period.

The areas of urban parks and green areas have steadily increased to meet urban residents’ needs for leisure and rest. However, the developed area of urban parks stood at 605 km², equivalent to 85.7% of the designated area of 706km².

Urban park area per capita; 2001 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Statistics of Urban Plan」

NOTE ㊦ An urban park refers to spatial facilities built to protect urban natural sceneries and enhance healthy, recreational and emotional life of citizens. ㊦ A green area refers to facilities to conserve or improve natural environments and prevent pollution or disasters from occurring. ㊦ An amusement park refers to entertainment and recreational facilities installed to enhance welfare of residents. ㊦ Developed area = designated area-undeveloped area

Fine Dust Concentration Level (PM2.5)



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with air quality in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding air environments in the region that they currently reside in

16µg/m³ in 2024, down 3µg/m³ from previous year


Among various air pollutants, fine dust matter draws particular attention because of its impact on public health. In particular, ultrafine particulate dust (PM2.5), which has recently emerged as a major concern, can penetrate deep into the pulmonary alveoli because of its extremely small particle size and is well known for its high toxicity. Fine dust can aggravate respiratory diseases such as asthma, impair lung function and reduce visibility. It consequently draws considerable public attention and is recognised both domestically and internationally as a serious environmental issue with substantial social costs.

The population-weighted average PM2.5 concentration across the 17 regions stood at 16µg/m³ in 2024, down 3 µg/m³ from 2023. The concentration remained within a relatively narrow range, declining from 26µg/m³ in 2015 to 23µg/m³ in 2019. It then decreased markedly in 2020, partly because of reductions in automobile use and capacity utilisation during the COVID-19 pandemic. From 2020 onward, it remained broadly stagnant until recording a relatively large decline in 2024.

By region, Incheon recorded the highest concentration, at


19µg/m³, followed by Seoul, Gyeonggi-do, Chungcheongbuk-do and Chungcheongnam-do, all at 17µg/m³ or above. Meanwhile, Gangwon-do, Jeollanam-do, Gyeongsangnam-do and Jeju-do recorded the lowest concentrations, at 13µg /m³, followed by Busan, Daegu and Daejeon, at 14µg/m³. In terms of the number of days classified as “bad” or “very bad” under the concentration standards, Seoul and Gyeonggi-do recorded the highest number, at 24 days, followed by Incheon at 23 days and Chungcheongnam-do at 20 days. By contrast, Jeollanam-do recorded the fewest such days, at 3 days, followed by Jeju-do at 4 days and Busan at 5 days.

Fine dust concentration levels; 2015 – 2024



SOURCE National Institute of Environmental Research, ‘Annual Report of Ambient Air Quality in Korea’
NOTE It refers to the population-weighted annual average of fine dust concentration (PM2.5) level in 17 regions.

Fine dust concentration levels and number of ‘Bad’ days by region; 2024



SOURCE National Institute of Environmental Research, ‘Annual Report of Ambient Air Quality in Korea’
NOTE ① It refers to the population-weighted annual average of fine dust concentration (PM2.5) in 17 regions ② The number of ‘Bad’ days is the total sum of the number of PM2.5 ‘Bad’ days(36-75) and the number of ‘Very Bad’ days (75-).

Waterworks Supply Rate in Rural Area



DEFINITION A proportion of households actually supplied with waterworks out of households eligible for waterworks supply in rural areas (-Myeon)
HOW TO MEASURE [Population with waterworks supply in rural areas (-Myeon) ÷ Total population in rural areas (-Myeon)] × 100

84.5% in 2024, up 1.0%p from previous year


Waterworks services play a key role in sanitation, industrial development and fire-fighting. They are essential public amenities for daily life, but their supply rates vary depending on each region’s residential environment, housing structure, and local government finances. In this sense, the waterworks supply rate serves as an indicator of the quality of regional living environments.

With the Korean government’s consistent expansion of infrastructure, the national waterworks supply rate reached 98.0% in 2024, a level comparable to those of developed countries, where rates are generally 95% or higher. However, regional gaps still exist. While waterworks services cover almost all urban areas, this is not yet the case in rural areas.

The waterworks supply rate in rural areas classified as Myeon reached 84.5% in 2024, up 1.0%p from 83.5% in 2023. The rate in rural areas has shown a continuous upward trend since 2001, when it stood at 29.0%. The increase was particularly noticeable around 2010, but annual growth has slowed to less than 2%p in recent years.


Among the 14 regions that include rural Myeon areas, most recorded waterworks supply rates of over 80%. Jeju-do recorded the lowest rate at 26.3%, while Incheon and Chungcheongbuk-do also remained below 80%.

Waterworks supply rate in rural areas by region; 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Climate, Energy, and Environment, ‘Statistics of Waterworks’
NOTE ① Regions without Myeon areas have been excluded. ② The population relying on the local or small-scaled drinking water system is not included in those supplied with water.

Waterworks supply rate in rural areas; 2001 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Climate, Energy, and Environment, ‘Statistics of Waterworks’
NOTE ① These are waterworks supply rate in Myeon areas. ② The population relying on the local or small-scaled drinking water system is not included in those supplied with water.

Air Quality Satisfaction





DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with air quality in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding air environments in the region that they currently reside in

42.8% in 2024, up 0.5%p from 2022

Individuals’ subjective evaluations of the environment are significant from the perspective of subjective well-being. Environmental satisfaction is measured across five aspects of the living environment: air quality, water quality, soil quality, noise level, and green environment. Public perceptions of fine dust concentration tend to be low, as reflected in relatively low levels of air quality satisfaction. Satisfaction with air quality declined continuously from 40.1% in 2012, including a notable decrease of 4.3%p in 2016 compared with 2014. However, it rebounded to 38.2% in 2020, up 9.6%p from 2018, and rose further to 42.8% in 2024, exceeding satisfaction with other environmental aspects such as water quality, soil quality and noise level. This improvement in air quality satisfaction suggests that public perceptions changed in response to actual improvements in air quality, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. There is a substantial gap in air quality satisfaction between urban (Dong) and rural (Eup/Myeon) areas. In 2024, the satisfaction rate was 61.9% in rural areas, considerably higher than the 38.7% recorded in urban areas. Air quality satisfaction in rural areas was nearly twice that in urban

areas until 2018, but the gap has since narrowed. The difference decreased from 30.0%p in 2010 to 23.2%p in 2024. By region, Jeju-do recorded the highest air quality satisfaction, at 68.7%, followed by Gangwon-do and Jeollanam-do, both above 60%. On the other hand, Incheon had the lowest air quality satisfaction at 30.6%, while Seoul (33.0%), Daegu (34.4%), and Ulsan (34.3%) also recorded relatively low levels. Compared with 2022, air quality satisfaction increased noticeably in Jeju-do and Jeollabuk-do, whereas Daejeon recorded the largest decline, at 6.2%p.



Water Quality Satisfaction




DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with water quality in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding rivers (water quality) of the region that they currently reside in

40.3% in 2024, down 0.8%p from 2022

Among the aspects of satisfaction with the living environment, water quality satisfaction is closely related to drinking water and is therefore important to quality of life because of its effects on health. Water quality satisfaction stood at 40.3% in 2024, down 0.8%p from 41.1% in 2022, but remained at a broadly similar level. It increased from 33.9% in 2010 to 36.9% in 2012, before declining continuously to 34.9% in 2014, 33.2% in 2016 and 29.3% in 2018. It then rose to 37.7% in 2020, the highest level recorded. In 2024, it remained slightly lower than air quality satisfaction (42.8%). A gap in water quality satisfaction exists between urban (Dong) and rural (Eup/Myeon) areas. In 2024, rural areas reported 52.6% satisfaction, 14.9%p higher than 37.7% in urban areas. By region, Jeollanam-do had the highest water quality satisfaction at 57.1%, followed by Jeju-do, Gangwon-do, and Sejong, all above 56%. In contrast, Incheon recorded the lowest satisfaction at 24.4%, while Seoul, Daegu, Ulsan, Gyeonggi-do and Chungcheongnam-do also

recorded levels below 40%. Notably, Sejong's satisfaction rate, at 56.7%, is considerably higher than those of the other metropolitan cities. Compared with 2022, overall water quality satisfaction declined slightly. In particular, Daejeon, Chungcheongnam-do and Ulsan recorded relatively large decreases, while Jeju-do, Sejong, Gwangju, Jeollabuk-do and Jeollanam-do recorded increases.



Soil Quality Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with soil quality in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding soil in the region that they currently reside in


39.1% in 2024, down 1.1%p from 2022

Among the five aspects of the living environment that reflect subjective well-being—air quality, water quality, soil quality, noise level and green environment—soil quality satisfaction stood at 39.1% in 2024, down 1.1%p from 2022. Soil quality satisfaction was slightly lower than water quality satisfaction (40.3%) and air quality satisfaction (42.8%). Although soil quality may have a less direct impact on individuals’ daily lives than air and water quality, perceived satisfaction levels were similar.


Satisfaction with soil quality increased from 30.4% in 2010 to 33.5% in 2012, then declined to 30.5% in 2014 and 29.4% in 2018. It subsequently rose to 36.7% in 2020 and 40.2% in 2022, before falling slightly in 2024.

Soil quality satisfaction tends to be higher in rural (Eup/Myeon) areas than in urban (Dong) areas. In urban areas, it showed little change until 2018, but increased to 38.3% in 2022 before declining to 36.6% in 2024. In rural areas, satisfaction declined after reaching 54.8% in 2012, but has recently increased, reaching 50.6% in 2024. The gap between urban and rural areas stood at 14.0%p in 2024.

By region, Sejong recorded the highest soil quality satisfaction, at 57.8%, followed by Jeollanam-do, Gangwon-do and Jeju-do, all above 50%. In contrast, Incheon recorded the lowest satisfaction, at 25.1%, while Seoul, Daegu and Ulsan also recorded levels below 35%. Compared with 2022, Sejong and Jeollanam-do recorded increases of over 6%p, while Ulsan recorded the largest decrease, at 6.6%p.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Social Survey’
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Social Survey’

Noise Level Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with the level of noise pollution in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of the respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding noise/vibration in the region that they currently reside in

37.6% in 2024, up 1.0%p from 2022


Among the five environmental aspects reflecting subjective well-being in the living environment—air quality, water quality, soil quality, noise level and green environment—noise has become increasingly important because urbanisation exposes people to various sources of noise in their daily lives. In particular, noise from road traffic and public transport has a significant impact on quality of life.

In 2024, satisfaction with noise levels stood at 37.6%, up 1.0%p from 2022. It fluctuated between 26% and 29% from 2010, when it stood at 27.3%, without showing any noticeable overall change. As with the other environmental satisfaction indicators, however, it increased sharply to 35.7% in 2020 and has since continued to rise slightly. Nevertheless, its increase was smaller than those recorded for air quality and water quality satisfaction.


Noise level satisfaction was higher in rural (Eup/Myeon) areas, at 54.4%, than in urban (Dong) areas, at 34.0%. Compared with the other environmental aspects, noise level satisfaction showed little change until the recent improvement.

By region, Sejong recorded the highest satisfaction, at 55.0%, followed by Jeollanam-do at 54.0%. Meanwhile, Incheon recorded the lowest satisfaction, at 27.4%, followed by Daegu at 29.0% and Seoul at 30.5%.

Compared with 2022, Sejong recorded the largest increase, at 9.5%p. Although changes varied across regions, noise level satisfaction increased in most regions except Seoul, Daegu, Ulsan, Gangwon-do and Chungcheongnam-do. Gangwon-do recorded the largest decline, at 3.9%p.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Social Survey’
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ‘Social Survey’

Green Environment Satisfaction



DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with green environments in their residential areas
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding green environments (mountains, parks, etc.) in the region that they currently reside in

59.0% in 2024, down 0.1%p from 2022


Among the five environmental aspects reflecting subjective well-being in the living environment—air quality, water quality, soil quality, noise level and green environment—green environment satisfaction measures how satisfied individuals are with natural features in their local area, such as mountains and parks. Green environments are closely linked to leisure activities and contribute significantly to quality of life.

In 2024, satisfaction with green environment stood at 59.0%, down 0.1%p from 59.1% in 2022 and remaining at a broadly similar level. Between 2010 and 2016, the satisfaction level remained stable at around 42%. It then increased by 8.9%p to 50.2% in 2018 and by a further 8.5%p to 58.7% in 2020. Compared with the other environmental aspects, for which satisfaction levels were around 40%, green environment satisfaction was considerably higher.

As with the other environmental aspects, green environment satisfaction was higher in rural (Eup/Myeon) areas than in urban (Dong) areas. In 2024, the satisfaction rate was 70.8% in rural areas and 56.5% in urban areas, a gap of 14.3%p. Satisfaction in urban areas remained stable at around 37.8% from 2010 to 2016, then increased by 7.5%p

in 2018 and by a further 9.0%p in 2020.

By region, Sejong recorded the highest green environment satisfaction, at 76.3%, followed by Gangwon-do (76.0%), Jeollanam-do (73.0%) and Gyeongsangnam-do (70.7%). Sejong, a newly developed city, also recorded a 7.3%p increase from 2022. On the other hand, Incheon (47.8%) and Daegu (48.7%) recorded the lowest satisfaction levels. Compared with 2022, Daejeon and Chungcheongnam-do saw the largest decreases, both exceeding 5%p. In contrast, Jeju-do recorded the second-largest increase after Sejong, rising by 6.0%p.



Climate Change Recognition



DEFINITION A proportion of the population who are anxious about climate change
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very worried” or “slightly worried” regarding climate change (heatwave, flood, etc.)

53.2% in 2024, up 7.3%p from 2022


Climate change has long-term impacts on the entire ecosystem, making it a crucial environmental issue. The level of public anxiety about climate change serves as an important indicator of overall public perceptions of environmental problems. Concerns about climate change and sustainability have recently increased amid more frequent extreme weather events and natural disasters.

In 2024, anxiety about climate change stood at 53.2%, up 7.3%p from 45.9% in 2022. After declining from 65.6% in 2008 to 49.3% in 2018 and 45.4% in 2020, before rising again to 53.2% in 2024.

There was no noticeable difference in climate change anxiety between urban (Dong) and rural (Eup/Myeon) areas, although the level was slightly higher in urban areas, at 53.7%, than in rural areas, at 50.5%.

By gender, women (56.4%) reported higher levels of anxiety than men (49.8%). This gender gap has persisted since 2012, with anxiety among women remaining 6–9%p higher than among men.

By age group, anxiety was highest among people in their 40s and 50s, at over 57%, and lowest among teenagers aged 13–19, at 46.4%. People in their 20s and those aged 60 and over both recorded levels of around 50%. Compared with 2022, anxiety increased by 5.4%p among those aged 13–19, while larger increases of 7.7%p and 8.6%p were recorded among those in their 50s and those aged 60 and over, respectively.






About

Safety is the most basic foundation that governments are expected to ensure for people’s quality of life. Insecurity is defined as “encompassing all external factors which put the physical integrity of individuals at risk” (Stiglitz et al., 2009). Traditionally, the Safety domain comprised indicators focusing on crimes and the legal system. However, as various risks of accidents in daily life, in addition to crime, have increasingly emerged as threats to societal safety, a range of safety accidents have also been included among the quality-of-life indicators.

Recent Trends

Among the nine indicators in the Safety domain, two improved, five deteriorated and two remained unchanged. The homicide rate, crime victimisation rate and feeling safe walking alone at night, which are key crime-related indicators, all deteriorated compared with the previous period. Among the safety accident indicators, the road traffic accident fatality rate and industrial accident mortality rate remained unchanged while the number of fire fatalities increased. For children, a particularly vulnerable group, the child mortality rate from safety accidents declined from the previous year, while the child abuse rate has shown an improving trend since 2021. The overall perception toward societal safety had also continued to improve until 2022 but deteriorated in 2024.



Homicide Rate



DEFINITION No. of homicides per 100,000 population
HOW TO MEASURE {No. of homicides ÷ No. of resident population registered} ×100,000

0.62 deaths in 2024, up 0.01 deaths from previous year

Homicide, or a death inflicted by another person, is one of the most extreme forms of crime victimisation and poses one of the biggest threat to safety. Therefore, its impact on individuals’ quality of life and perception of safety is considerable.

The homicide rate was 1.68 per 100,000 population in 2002 and has generally declined since 2006. After falling below 1 per 100,000 population to 0.85 in 2016, it remained stable at around 0.61 in 2022, increasing slightly from 0.61 in 2023 to 0.62 in 2024.

By gender, the homicide rate for men declined from 1.86 per 100,000 population in 2000 to 0.62 in 2024. For women, the rate peaked at 1.85 in 2005, then gradually declined to 0.61 in 2024. The gender gap narrowed over time, and since 2014, the rates for men and women have been similar. However, while the rate increased from 0.58 in 2023 to 0.62 in 2024 among men, it declined from 0.64 to 0.61 among women over the same period.



Crime Victimisation Rate



DEFINITION No. of crime cases collected in a self-reported method over the past year
HOW TO MEASURE {(estimated) No. of crimes committed ÷ Population aged 14 and over} × 100,000


6,439 cases in 2022, up from 2020

The crime victimisation rate directly affects personal safety and, at the societal level, generates social costs that affect not only individual quality of life but also overall social well-being.


Official crime statistics are compiled based on cases recognised and processed by the police and prosecution. Thus, crimes that are not reported to law enforcement or that are reported but not officially recorded are excluded from official crime statistics, leading to the issue of “hidden crime.” Crime victimisation data collected through self-reported surveys helps identify these hidden crimes and provide a more accurate estimate of the number of crimes committed.

According to the National Safety Survey conducted by the Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice, the crime victimisation rate declined from 2012 to 2016. It began to increase from 2018 onward, with a particularly noticeable rise in 2022, when it reached 6,439 cases per 100,000 population. However, changes in the detailed crime victimisation categories in the 2020 and 2022 surveys should be taken into account when making time-series comparisons. In 2022, harassment and stalking were separated into distinct categories, while new categories such as illegal filming and phishing were introduced. These may have contributed to the sharp increase in the crime victimisation rate.

When classified into violent crimes and property crimes, the property crime rate (5,397 per 100,000 population) was substantially higher than the violent crime rate (1,041 per 100,000 population). While the property crime rates had gradually declined since 2012, it increased sharply in 2022. The violent crime rate, which had dropped sharply from 768 per 100,000 population in 2012 to below 400 in 2014, subsequently increased to 566 in 2018, 878 in 2020, and 1,041 in 2022.



SOURCE Korean Institute of Criminology & Justice, “National Public Safety Survey,”
NOTE ① The crime victimisation rate refers to estimated crime cases based on a proportion of people who report crime victimisation experience at least once over the past one year. ② In 2022 survey, harassment and stalking had been separated; illegal filming and phishing had been added.



SOURCE Korean Institute of Criminology & Justice, “National Public Safety Survey,”
NOTE ① The crime victimisation rate refers to estimated crime cases based on a proportion of people who report crime victimisation experience at least once over the past one year. ② In 2022 survey, harassment and stalking had been separated; illegal filming and phishing had been added.

Feeling Safe Walking Alone at Night



DEFINITION A proportion of the population who perceive that they are safe while walking during the night
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very safe” or “somewhat safe” when they walk alone at night


69.5% in 2024, down 0.9%p from 2022

The safety of residential areas can be assessed through individuals’ subjective perceptions of how safe their surroundings are. A key indicator of residential safety is “feeling safe walking at night,” which measures how safe individuals feel when walking alone near their homes at night. This internationally recognised indicator is widely used in the safety domain.

According to the Social Survey conducted by MODS, the question format changed over time. Until 2018, respondents were asked whether there were places near their homes where they felt unsafe walking alone at night, and those who answered “no” were classified as feeling safe. The proportion increased from 51.4% in 2001 and exceeded 60% for the first time in 2018. From 2020 onward, the survey adopted a 4-point scale that directly asked respondents how safe they felt walking alone at night. Continuing the previous upward trend, the proportion increased to 66.5% in 2020 and 70.4% in 2022, before declining slightly to 69.5% in 2024.

There is a large gender gap in feeling safe walking alone at night. 55.1% of women reported feeling safe walking alone at night, compared with 84.2% of men, a gap of 29.1%p. By region, the proportion feeling safe walking at night has been consistently higher in rural (Eup/Myeon) areas than in urban (Dong) areas, though the gap has considerably narrowed over time. In 2001, the urban-rural gap exceeded 10%p with rates of 49.0% in urban areas and 60.9% in rural areas. By 2024, the gap narrowed down less than 1%p, with 69.4% in urban areas and 70.2% in rural areas, indicating a noticeable improvement in perceptions of safety in urban areas.

By age group, the proportion feeling safe walking alone at night ranged from 69% to 70%, with differences of less than 1%p across age groups, suggesting little variation by age. Compared with 2022, the proportion increased among those aged 13–19 and those in their 20s, whereas it declined slightly among those aged 30 and over.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, “Social Survey,”
NOTE ① This indicator was measure as a proportion of respondents who answered “none” when asked if there was any place they feel unsafe walking alone at night in 2018, as a proportion of respondents feeling safe walking alone at night in 2020 and afterwards. ② The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2010 and those aged 13 and over from 2012 onwards.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, “Social Survey,”

Industrial Accident Mortality Rate




DEFINITION No. of deaths due to industrial accidents and/or diseases per 10,000 workers covered by the industrial accident and safety insurance
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of deaths due to industrial accidents ÷ No. of workers covered by industrial accident and safety insurance) × 10,000

0.98 deaths in 2024, same as previous year

Industrial accidents are an important indicator of workplace safety, as they reflect accidents occurring in work environments. While industrial accident levels can be assessed in various ways, some incidents go unreported or are omitted from official statistics, and the extent of underreporting varies across countries and over time. The most reliable measure, with relatively fewer underreporting concerns, is the number of workplace fatalities caused by industrial accidents. The industrial accident fatality rate refers to the proportion of workers covered by industrial accident insurance who die from work-related injuries or illnesses, expressed as the number of fatalities per 10,000 workers. In 2024, there were 2,098 industrial accident-related fatalities, an increase of 82 from 2,016 in 2023. However, the industrial accident mortality rate workers remained unchanged from the previous year at 0.98 per 10,000 workers. The rate has declined steadily, from 2.55 per 10,000 workers in 2003 to 1.36 in 2010 and 0.96 in 2016. Since 2016, it has fluctuated at around 1.0 per 10,000 workers.

Industrial accident fatalities increase with age. In 2024,

workers aged 60 and over accounted for 1,107 deaths, or 52.8% of all industrial accident fatalities. When classified into work-related accidents and occupational illnesses, both accident-related and illness-related fatalities were higher among those in the 50s and those aged 60 and over. Of all fatalities from work-related accidents, 25.9% involved workers in their 50s and 48.9% involved those aged 60 and over, indicating that older workers are at a higher risk of workplace accidents and fatalities.



SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 「Industrial Accident Statistics」

Industrial accident mortality rate; 2003 – 2024



SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 「Industrial Accident Statistics」

NOTE ① This shows the number of deaths due to work-related accidents or diseases. ② Deaths due to traffic accidents outside workplace, sports activities, violent acts, deaths occurred in an accident that lapsed 1 year or longer from the date of accident and deaths on regular commuting are excluded from the number of deaths (deaths from traffic accidents outside workplace are included only for those in the transportation, restaurant/lodging industries).

Number of Fire Fatalities



DEFINITION No. of deaths caused by fires each year
HOW TO MEASURE No. of deaths calculated based on the annual incidence of fires

308 deaths in 2024, up 25 deaths from previous year

Fires are among the most common safety hazards in daily life, causing damage to property and human life and potentially leading to major disasters. The extent of fire damage varies greatly depending on the effectiveness of prevention and response systems. Therefore, the number of fire fatalities serves as an important indicator of a society's level of fire safety.


In 2024, the number of fire fatalities was 308, an increase of 25 from 2023. By contrast, the number of fire incidents declined from 38,857 in 2023 to 37,614 in 2024.

The number of fire fatalities had been declining since 2001, when it stood at 516 deaths. Until 2009, 400 or more fire-related deaths occurred annually, but from 2010 onward, this number decreased to around 300 per year. In 2015, the number of fire fatalities reached its lowest level, at 253, but has fluctuated since then.

The number of fire incidents stood at 34,844 cases in 2000 but increased to 47,882 cases in 2007 following the introduction of the National Fire Classification System. Since then, fire incidents have remained above 40,000 per year, reaching 41,863 in 2010, 44,435 in 2015, before declining to 37,614 in 2024.


Although the number of fire incidents increased compared with 2000, the number of fire fatalities decreased by 183 between 2002 and 2024, indicating a long-term reduction in fire-related deaths.

Meanwhile, despite the declining trend in fire incidents, fire-related property damage has continued to increase because of the expansion and growing complexity of buildings. In particular, in 2022, fire-related property damage reached a record high of 1.21 trillion KRW, before decreasing to 783.9 billion KRW in 2024.



SOURCE National Fire Agency, 「Fire Statistical Yearbook」

Number of fire cases & property damage; 2000 – 2024



SOURCE National Fire Agency, 「Fire Statistical Yearbook」


Road Traffic Accident Fatality Rate

Definition No. of mortalities due to traffic accidents per 100,000 population
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of mortalities due to traffic accidents ÷ Total population) × 100,000

4.9 deaths in 2024, unchanged from 2023


Cars improve the convenience of transportation and enhance quality of life. However, they also pose a threat to people's safety. The number of fatalities from traffic accidents is a key indicator of traffic safety. Korea's road traffic accident fatality rate is relatively high among OECD countries, and the lack of guaranteed pedestrian safety on roads implies that people are exposed to physical danger in daily life, negatively affecting their quality of life. Road traffic accident fatality rate has steadily declined since the 2000s. The number of road traffic accident fatalities per 100,000 population decreased from 15.2 in 2002 to 9.4 in 2014, falling below 10. This declining trend continued, with the fatality rate reaching 4.9 per 100,000 people in 2023 and remaining unchanged in 2024.

Meanwhile, the number of road traffic accidents remained between 210,000 and 230,000 cases from the 2000s until 2019. In 2020, it fell below 200,000 cases and has shown little change since then. In 2024, the number stood at 196,349, slightly increasing from the previous year. As the decline in the number of traffic accidents was smaller than the decline in fatalities, the number of deaths per accident also appears to have decreased.



SOURCE Korea Road Traffic Authority, ¹Traffic Accident Analysis System; Ministry of Data and Statistics, ¹Population Projections; (as of 2022)
NOTE RTA mortalities refer to those who died due to a traffic accident on the road within 30 days from the date of the accident. (death within 72 hours included until 1999)

Among vulnerable groups, the number of traffic accident fatalities among children aged 12 and under was 12 in 2024, corresponding to a fatality rate of 0.3 per 100,000 children. By contrast, the number of traffic accident fatalities among those aged 65 and over stood at 1,299, corresponding to a fatality rate of 13.1 per 100,000 population, more than twice the overall traffic accident fatality rate. This highlights the particular vulnerability of older persons to road traffic accidents. However, the numbers of traffic accident fatalities among both children and older persons have steadily decreased since 2011.



Child Mortality Rate from Safety Accidents

DEFINITION No. of deaths due to safety accidents per 100,000 children aged under 15
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of deaths among children aged under 15 due to safety accidents ÷ Registered population aged under 15) × 100,000

2.1 deaths in 2024, down 0.2 from previous year



Children are more exposed to safety accidents, such as transport accidents, fall, drowning, suffocation, burn, and poisoning, because of their limited knowledge and experience of safety. As a major indicator representing the social safety net, the child mortality rate from safety accidents indicates how safe society is and how well the vulnerable groups, including children, are protected in society. This indicator is also utilised as basic data for policies related to systems and environments where children can grow up safe and healthy.

The number of children aged 14 and under who died from safety accidents stood at 115 in 2024, a consistent decline since 2000. The number of fatalities per 100,000 children also declined from 2.3 in 2023 to 2.1 in 2024. The child mortality rate from safety accidents fell sharply from 12.5 deaths per 100,000 children in 2002 to 4.8 in 2010. In 2016, it fell below 3, to 2.8, and since then, it has remained in the range of 2 deaths per 100,000 children with some fluctuations.

The number of child fatalities from safety accidents dropped

from 1,226 in 2002 to 387 in 2010, falling to less than one-third of its 2002 level. Since 2016, the number has remained below 200, and since 2021, it has remained below 150.

By type of safety accident, relatively large numbers of deaths were caused by traffic accidents and drowning. Compared with 2000, however, the proportions of traffic accidents and drowning declined, while the proportion attributable to other external causes gradually increased.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, ¹Causes of Death Statistics; Ministry of Data and Statistics, ¹Resident Registration Central Population;
NOTE Coverage of Safety Accident: traffic accident, fall, drowning, suffocation, burn, poisoning included (deaths in accident excluding suicide and murder out of external causes of death)

Perception toward Societal Safety

DEFINITION A proportion of the population perceive the society as safe in general
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied "very safe" or "somewhat safe" regarding overall social safety


28.9% in 2024, down 4.4%p from 2022

Perception toward societal safety indicates how safe people feel society is overall. To fully understand the safety level of a society, subjective indicators should be considered along with objective ones. Even if the number of safety accidents or crimes declines, people's anxiety about societal safety may be not necessarily relieved. Thus, it is crucial to assess quality of life through an analysis of changes in people's perceptions of overall societal safety and to understand characteristics of people with a low sense of safety when determining national policy directions.

In 2024, the proportion of people who felt safe regarding the overall society stood at 28.9%, down 4.4%p from 33.3% in 2022. Perception toward the societal safety, which had increased from 8.2% in 2008 to 13.7% in 2012, declined to 9.5% in 2014. The decline in 2014 may be attributable to the Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014. From 2016, the proportion began increasing again, with a sharp rise in 2020. However, in 2024, it declined again to 28.9%. Incidents such as the Itaewon disaster in October 2022 and the Osong underpass disaster in July 2023, both of which occurred after the May

2022 survey, may have influenced this decline.

By gender, 32.6% of men perceived society as safe, 7.4%p higher than the proportion of women, at 25.2%. By age group, those aged 60 and over had the lowest perception of safety at 24.3%, while those aged 13–19 had the highest, at 37.9%. Over time, those aged 13–19 consistently showed a relatively higher perception of safety than the other age groups. While




there were no consistent differences among the remaining age groups, the data indicate that younger individuals tend to perceive society as safer. Compared with 2022, the proportion of people who felt safe has decreased across all age groups, with a particularly large decline of more than 6%p among those in their 20s and 40s.


Among the 17 regions, Sejong recorded the highest proportion of people who perceived society as safe overall, at 38.7%. Busan, Seoul, Daejeon and Gyeongsangnam-do followed, with more than 30% of respondents in each region feeling safe. In contrast, Chungcheongbuk-do recorded the lowest proportion, at 22.5%, while Daegu, Incheon, and Jeollanam-do also recorded relatively low proportions of less than 25%. Compared with 2022, Incheon (-9.2%p), Daejeon (-8.7%p), Chungcheongbuk-do (-7.6%p), and Ulsan (-7.2%p) recorded the largest declines in perceptions of safety.

Perceptions of safety varied across specific aspects of societal safety. The highest proportions were recorded for food safety (40.7%) and food security (38.8%), followed closely by national security at 38.5%. On the other hand, the proportion who felt safe from personal information leakage was particularly low, at 13.6%, while the proportions who felt safe from traffic accidents, cybersecurity threats, emerging diseases and crime were also below 25%. Conversely, personal information leakage had the highest

proportion of respondents who felt unsafe, at 57.6%, followed by cybersecurity threats, emerging diseases and crime, for each of which more than 40% of respondents felt unsafe. Compared with 2022, the perception of safety from natural disasters declined by 6.6%p, the largest decrease among all categories.



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'
NOTE 'Safe' refers to a proportion of respondents who replied 'very safe' and 'somewhat safe', and 'unsafe' to a proportion of those who replied 'very unsafe' and 'somewhat unsafe'



Child Abuse Rate



DEFINITION Number of child abuse cases confirmed in relation to children population out of the reported cases of child abuse
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of cases where children under 18 were abused (finally confirmed) ÷ Estimated population aged under 18) × 100,000

356.8 cases in 2024, down 7.3 cases from previous year


Protection for human rights and safety of children is one of the important elements in assessing society’s accountability and moral responsibility toward future generations as well as in safeguarding children’s right to live and improving their quality of life, as they are physically and socially vulnerable. It is especially crucial as the experience of abuse during childhood, when children deserve protection, can affect them throughout their lives. Child abuse refers to physical, emotional and/or sexual violence or abusive treatment by adults, including caregivers, that may compromise children’s health, welfare or mental development. It also includes abandonment and neglect by caregivers. As well as in households, the abuse in preschools or kindergartens has also become a social issue. Recently, domestic child abuse has drawn particular attention following a fatal case of domestic violence.

The child abuse rate increased gradually from 21.3 cases per 100,000 children in 2002 before beginning to rise sharply in 2014. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate was 401.6 cases per 100,000 children, an increase of 21.3 cases from the previous year. In 2021, it further increased to 501.9 cases, rising by 100.3 cases compared with 2020. However,

the rate sharply declined to 384.7 cases in 2022 and further to 364.1 cases in 2023, returning to its pre-pandemic level. In 2024, it declined again by 7.3 cases to 356.8 cases.

As public awareness and social sensitivity regarding child abuse have increased, the number of reports may also have risen. Notably, after the reinforcement of child abuse-related laws in 2014, the number of reports has continued to rise. This suggests that improved social safety nets may have brought previously hidden cases of child abuse to light, rather than there having been an actual increase in the number of abused children. The sharp increase in child abuse reports in 2021 may have been affected by media coverage of child abuse incidents that occurred at the end of 2020, school closures that made abuse more difficult to detect, and policy measures implemented to prevent child abuse. However, given that a case is counted as child abuse only when it is reported to relevant authorities and subsequently confirmed as child abuse, this figure may not capture all actual cases of child abuse. Many cases remain concealed, and structural barriers which make reporting difficult still exist. This highlights the need for continued attention to the issue.

Child abuse rate; 2002–2024



SOURCE Ministry of Health & Welfare, ¹Report on Child Abuse; Ministry of Data and Statistics, ²Population Projections; (as of 2022)
NOTE Cases which have been finally confirmed as abuse are counted as child abuse cases.

Civic Engagement




About

The Civic Engagement domain concerns a balance among government, society, and civil society achieved through the active participation of citizens. It encompasses both the processes and outcomes of embedding quality of life at both subjective and objective levels in the overall development of society and in individuals' daily lives. The domain includes civic duties and rights, political participation, and trust. The first three elements represent the concrete processes through which a strong civil society operates, while trust is established as an outcome when these processes function properly.

Recent Trends

Among the seven indicators in the Civic Engagement domain, five improved and the remaining two deteriorated compared with the previous period. The voter turnout rate increased in 2025 and perception of political empowerment improved slightly from the previous year. The Corruption perceptions index, whose upward trend stalled in 2023, increased again to 64 in 2024. Interpersonal trust improved from the previous year in 2024, while institutional trust continued to decline following the sharp increase during the COVID-19 pandemic. The voluntary work participation rate, which plummeted in 2021 due to the impact of COVID-19, has since recovered but has not yet recovered to its previous trend. Citizenship deteriorated compared with the previous year.



Voter Turnout Rate


DEFINITION A proportion of eligible voters who voted in the presidential election out of the total number of electorates
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of voters in Presidential Election ÷ No. of electorates in the presidential election) × 100

79.4% in 2025, up 2.3%p from 2022


Political engagement refers to the degree of citizens' participation in political processes, including all activities intended to influence the election of representatives or political and policy decisions. For the political process to retain legitimacy and representativeness, citizens should express their political views and demands through elections. The voter turnout rate indicates the extent to which citizens are interested in politics and express their opinions. Therefore, the rate is considered as a key quantitative indicator of the quality of democracy, together with the degree of political engagement.

Since the foundation of the nation, the voter turnout rate in Korea remained above 80% until the 1990s. However, voter turnout in presidential elections began to decline in the 2000s, falling to 63.0% in the 2007 presidential election. It subsequently increased to 77.2% in 2017 and further to 79.4% in the 2025 presidential election, up 2.3%p from 2022.


By age group, according to the results of a post-election sample survey, the voter turnout was relatively high at 70% or above, among those in their 50s, 60s and 70s in 2025. In the 2025 election, turnout increased across all age groups except those in their 60s. In particular, it increased by 3%p or more among people under 40 and those aged 80 and over. By region, Gwangju, Sejong, Jeollabuk-do and Jeollanam-do recorded higher voter turnout rates than the other regions, at 82% or above, while Jeju-do recorded the lowest rate at 74.6%.



SOURCE National Election Commission, 「Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections」



SOURCE National Election Commission, 「Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections」
NOTE The turnout rates by age are based on results of the sample survey conducted by the National Election Commission after the election.



SOURCE National Election Commission, 「Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections」

Perception of Political Empowerment



DEFINITION A proportion of the population who believe that they are politically empowered

HOW TO MEASURE Arithmetic average of proportions of respondents who answered “never agree” or “little agree” to the following statements: ‘people like me cannot have any influence on what the government does’ or ‘the government never agrees to thoughts or opinions of people like me’


18.2% in 2024, up 0.6%p from 2023

Citizens’ active engagement in politics and policy-making to exert influence can contribute to the development of democracy and enhance individuals’ quality of life. Perception of political empowerment is defined as the degree to which citizens believe that they can influence political processes. Political participation is enhanced when citizens perceive themselves as politically empowered, reflecting their potential for civic engagement. Perception of political empowerment is measured based on responses to the following statements: “People like me have no influence on what the government does” and “The government is not interested in the thoughts or opinions of people like me.” The proportion of respondents who disagreed with these statements stood at 18.2% in 2024, an increase of 0.6%p from the previous year. This proportion fluctuated over time, falling from 26.7% in 2013 to 17.6% in 2020 and further to 15.2% in 2022, before slightly increasing in 2023.

By each statement, 17.8% of respondents felt that they could influence government actions, while 18.6% believed that the government was interested in citizens’ opinions. Compared with the previous year, the former proportion increased by 0.9%p from 16.9% in 2023, while the latter increased by 0.3%p from 18.3%.


By gender, 19.6% of men expressed a sense of political empowerment, 3.0%p higher than the proportion of women, at 16.7%. By age group, those in their 40s recorded the highest proportion at 19.9%, while those aged 60 and over reported a relatively low level of political empowerment at 17.5%. Compared with 2023, the gender gap narrowed. The age pattern also reversed in 2024: political empowerment was higher among people under 50, whereas it had been higher among those aged 50 and over in 2023.

Perception of political empowerment; 2013 – 2024 %



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey,
NOTE The survey covered people aged 19 to 69 until 2019 and those aged 19 and over from 2020 onwards.

Perception of political empowerment by gender & age group; 2023, 2024 %



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey

Institutional Trust



DEFINITION A proportion of the population who place trust in major institutions and systems

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “can place trust very much” or “can place trust a little bit” on 16 organisations (+ the government, National Assembly, courts, Prosecutor’s Office, police, local governments, military, labour unions, civic organisations, TV broadcasting stations, newspaper companies, education institutions, medical institutes, large conglomerates and financial firms)

49.6% in 2024, down 1.5%p from 2023

The level of trust citizens place in various systems and organisations in society indicates how well these institutions operate and represent people’s demands and interests. In a democratic society, the more people trust public institutions and systems, the greater the legitimacy of those institutions and systems. Institutional trust is measured based on trust in 16 institutions including the government, the National Assembly, courts, the Prosecutor’s Office, the police, local governments, the military, labour unions, civic organisations, TV broadcasting stations, newspaper companies, educational institutes, medical institutes, conglomerates, religious groups and financial firms.


Institutional trust declined from 44.7% in 2013 and remained at around 40% until 2019. Then, it increased sharply to 48.3% in 2020 and even to 55.4% in 2021. Since 2022, it has declined again, reaching 49.6% in 2024. The increase in overall trust in 2020 and 2021 may have reflected broad public support for the government’s response to COVID-19.

By sector, the educational sector had the highest level of trust at 65.2%, followed by the medical sector and financial institutions, both exceeding 60%. By contrast, trust in the National Assembly was the lowest at 24.7%. Given that trust in most institutions recorded at around 50%, trust in the National Assembly was particularly low. However, it has increased slightly over the past two years.

Compared with 2023, the largest declines in trust were in the medical sector at 10.6%p and in the government at 9.8%p, whereas the increases were relatively large in labour unions at 5.1%p and in the religious sector at 4.1%p.


By region, institutional trust was higher in rural (Eup/Myeon) areas at 51.6% than in urban (Dong) areas at 49.2%. By age group, those aged under 30 reported the lowest level of trust at 47.7%, while those aged 60 and over had the highest at 51.6%. By gender, trust levels were similar, at 49.3% among men and at 49.9% among women.

Institutional trust; 2013 – 2024 %



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey,
NOTE The survey covered people aged 19 to 69 until 2019 and those aged 19 and over from 2020 onwards.

Trust in each institutions; 2023, 2024 %



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey

Corruption Perceptions Index



DEFINITION An index of perception regarding corruption in the public sector including the government


HOW TO MEASURE The corruption perceptions index is measured by Transparency International on a scale of up to 100 points. The higher the scores, the less it is corrupted.

30th out of 180 countries, with a score of 64 in 2024

As it is difficult to objectively measure government corruption, subjective perceptions are commonly used. The subjective perceptions of experts regarding corruption reflect how impartially the government operates and represents the interests of the population as a whole. The more upright the government is perceived to be, the more people are likely to trust it, which may contribute to better government performance. As “corruption” has been selected as one of six factors affecting happiness in the World Happiness Report published by the SDSN the level of corruption in society is closely related to quality of life.

Since 1995, Transparency International(TI) has published the Corruption Perceptions Index based on assessments by experts specialising in country analysis at international organisations such as the World Bank. The index measures perceived levels of public sector corruption in each country. Korea’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which reflects perceived integrity, gradually increased from 4.3 in 1995 to 5.6 in 2008 on a scale of 10. Afterwards, it remained stagnant for some time before beginning to rise again. In 2012, the index was converted to a scale of 100. In 2024, it stood at 64, up one point from the previous year.

Corruption perceptions index; 2002–2024



SOURCE Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2024*

NOTE © Since 2012, it has been changed from a scale of 10 into that of 100. For the proper comparison, data prior to 2012 had been converted into the 100-point scale.

© The percentile rank refers to the ranking of South Korea in case countries surveyed are integrated for each year.

In 2024, Korea ranked 30th out of 180 countries, up two places from 32nd in 2023. After rising from 52nd in 2016 to 33rd in 2020, Korea’s CPI ranking remained relatively stable for several years, with limited improvement in both its score and ranking. As about half of OECD countries scored 70 or above, a noticeable gap remains between Korea and these countries, indicating that further improvement is necessary. Since the number of surveyed countries changes each year, Korea’s percentile ranking provides more meaningful information than its absolute rank alone. Korea’s position improved from the top 46.2% in 2001 to the top 21.7% in 2009, before fluctuating around the top 25% for several years. Since 2016, when it stood at the top 29.5%, Korea’s position has steadily improved. From 2020 onward, Korea has maintained within the top 20% of countries in terms of CPI, reaching top 16.7% in 2024.


In 2024, Denmark ranked first with a score of 90, followed by Finland, which scored above 85. Among OECD countries, Italy (54), Greece (49), and Mexico (31) were among the eight countries scoring below 55 and ranking outside the top 50.

The countries ranked in top 10 in 2024 also scored 80 or above in 2014, although most recorded lower CPI scores than in 2014. New Zealand’s CPI fell from 91 in 2014 to 83 in 2024, while Sweden’s declined from 87 to 80. Although many countries recorded lower CPI scores than in 2014, some countries, including Korea, Estonia, and Italy, showed relatively large increases.

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX

Transparency International surveys experts specialized in national analysis from 13 international organisations like the World Bank regarding corruption levels of the public sector in each nation. It includes the following questions: “To what degree power-related corruption is punished?”, “Are allocation and execution of governmental budgets disclosed in a transparent manner?”, “Is there any expenditure related to special public affairs that are indescribable?”, “Is there any independent body that monitors public resources?”, “Is there enough legal protection for whistle blowers or journalists who have reported corruption?”

Corruption perceptions index of OECD Countries; 2014, 2024



SOURCE Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2024*

NOTE The numeral following each country's name is CPI ranking among 180 countries in 2024.

Citizenship



DEFINITION Degree of perception toward importance of citizenship

HOW TO MEASURE Arithmetic average of scores that respondents assigned to the 8 items of importance related to citizens' obligations

5.23 in 2024, down 0.08 from 2023

Citizenship means civil rights to which citizens are entitled, as well as the virtues, roles, and duties that citizens are expected to uphold. The degree to which citizens agree with these elements of citizenship, which form the foundation of democracy, is a representative indicator of societal quality and reflects maturity of democracy.


Citizenship is measured based on the scores respondents assigned to the following eight statements on civic duties and virtues: ① I always participate in elections, ② I pay taxes honestly, ③ I abide by laws and rules, ④ I take an interest in what the government is doing, ⑤ I actively participate in social or political organisations, ⑥ I respect others' thoughts and opinions, ⑦ I purchase ethical and environmentally friendly products even if they cost more, and ⑧ I am willing to serve in the military in a national emergency.

The citizenship score declined from 5.31 in 2023 to 5.23 in 2024, on a scale of 7. After a decline from 5.55 in 2013 to 5.26 in 2021, it remained stable at a similar level.

By item, 'voting participation', 'tax payment' and 'compliance with laws and rules' received the highest scores, at 5.7, while 'social or political activities' was perceived as the least important at 4.6. Compared with 2023, scores declined for most items, except 'social or political activities' which increased by 0.2 and 'selecting ethical and eco-friendly products' which remained unchanged.

By gender, there was no noticeable difference between men at 5.23 and women at 5.24. By age group, the citizenship score was 5.10 among those aged 19 to 29 and 5.33 among those in their 50s, indicating only a small age difference.

Citizenship; 2013 – 2024



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 'Korea Social Integration Survey'
NOTE From 2020, the age coverage of the survey has changed from, the population aged 19 to 69 to aged 19 and over.

Citizenship by item; 2024



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 'Korea Social Integration Survey'

Voluntary Work Participation Rate



DEFINITION A proportion of the population participating in voluntary activities

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of people who participated in voluntary activities over the past year

14.4% in 2025, up 3.8%p from 2023

Voluntary work can promote citizenship and the public good by benefiting those in need and providing volunteers with a sense of satisfaction. When voluntary work is active across society, social bonding and solidarity are strengthened and communities become revitalised. This further encourages voluntary work and creates a virtuous circle.


The voluntary work participation rate, defined as the proportion of people who engaged in voluntary activities over the past year, rose from 14.6% in 2003 to 19.3% in 2009 and remained between 18% and 19% until 2015, when the downward trend began. In particular, the rate nearly halved from 16.1% in 2019 to 8.4% in 2021 due to restrictions on face-to-face activities during the COVID-19 pandemic. It somewhat recovered to 14.4% in 2025 but remained below the pre-COVID-19 level. Among participants, the average number of times they engaged in voluntary work stood at 8.3 times in 2025, down from 9.3 in 2023.

The participation rate was slightly higher among women at 15.0% than among men at 13.7%. However, a noticeable difference was observed across age groups. The rate was 67.1% among those aged 13 to 19 while it was around 10% among the other age groups. Among those aged 20 or over, the rate was relatively high among those in their 50s at 14.0%. This age gap suggests that voluntary activities are largely undertaken by students aged 13 to 19. The sharp decline in participation after school graduation suggests that such activities may be regarded mainly as part of the school curriculum or as a means of earning school credits. Furthermore, many people in their 50s may be parents of students aged 13–19. It is therefore necessary to encourage people across age groups to participate in voluntary activities of their own accord.

Unlike the participation rate, the average number of times


participants engaged in voluntary work was lowest among those aged 13–19, at 4.6, and increased with age. Those aged 60 and over participated most frequently, with an average of 12.6 times. This suggests that once people begin participating in voluntary work, they are more likely to continue doing so.

Voluntary work participation rate; 2003 – 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'
NOTE The survey covered people aged 15 and over until 2009 and those aged 13 and over from 2011 onwards.

Voluntary work participation rate and frequency activities by age group; 2025



SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 'Social Survey'
NOTE The participation frequency refers to the average number of participation sessions per participant.

Interpersonal Trust

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who trust others
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “can trust a little bit” or “can trust very much” to the question to what degree they can trust others

55.7% in 2024, up 3.0%p from previous year

Interpersonal trust is assessed by the extent to which individuals can trust people in general, including those with whom they are not personally close. When people trust only a small and limited number of others, solidarity and social bonds become weak. Distrust can also lead to conflict between groups and impose additional social costs. By contrast, mutual trust among members of society, regardless of personal closeness, can promote both social capital and social cohesion.

Interpersonal trust, which indicates the level of trust in others, had generally declined since 2014. After falling from 73.7% in 2014 to 65.3% in 2017, it fluctuated moderately. In 2020, it declined sharply by 15.6%p to 50.6% from the previous year.


The deterioration in interpersonal trust in 2020 may have reflected social changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing became part of daily life, and the fear of getting infected from others may have negatively affected the interpersonal trust. In 2021, interpersonal trust somewhat recovered, while the pandemic continued. Despite an increase by 3.0%p to 55.7% in 2024 from the previous year, it remained below the pre-COVID-19 level.

No consistent gender pattern was observed in interpersonal trust. By region, however, interpersonal trust was higher in rural areas, at 62.9%, than in urban areas, at 54.1%.

By age group, lowest interpersonal trust was lowest among those aged 19 to 29, at 53.3%, while it was similar at around 56% among those aged 40 and over. Compared with 2023, interpersonal trust increased across all age groups, with particularly large increases among those under 40: 6.6%p among those aged 19 to 29 and 6.5%p among those in their 30s.




Interpersonal trust; 2013 – 2024



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」
NOTE The survey covered people aged 19 to 69 until 2019 and those aged 19 and over from 2020 onwards.

Interpersonal trust by region & age group; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

Subjective Well-being




About

Subjective well-being is a representative indicator of quality of life especially from the perspective of individuals. Objective indicators provide useful information on quality of life, but the combination of objective conditions does not always correspond to the overall life satisfaction that individuals actually perceive. Rather than contradicting objective indicators, subjective indicators serve as complementary measures which capture aspects of life not covered by objective indicators, while objective measurements can also affect subjective indicators. Measures of subjective well-being are divided into cognitive and emotional factors. Cognitive factors assess satisfaction with life as a whole or with specific areas of life, based on criteria that individuals themselves regard as important. Emotional factors measure positive and negative emotions based on day-to-day emotional experiences.

Recent Trends

Among the three indicators included in the Subjective Well-being domain, life satisfaction remained unchanged, negative emotions deteriorated, and positive emotions improved. Life satisfaction increased from 6.0 in 2020 to 6.5 in 2022, and has remained stagnant since then. Positive emotions improved slightly in 2024 after remaining stable in recent years. Negative emotions, which peaked at 4.0 in 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, declined to 3.1 in 2023 but increased to 3.8 in 2024.



Life Satisfaction



DEFINITION Subjective satisfaction in general with individuals' current life
HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses regarding satisfaction with the current life on a scale of 0 to 10


6.4 in 2024, unchanged from previous year

As one of the factors measuring the cognitive aspect of subjective well-being, life satisfaction indicates the level of satisfaction that individuals feel with their lives. Since quality of life is multi-dimensional and individuals' subjective judgements of their experiences are crucial, life satisfaction is one of the most representative indicators of quality of life.


In 2024, life satisfaction stood at 6.4, the same as in 2023. After rising from 5.7 in 2013 to 6.0 in 2017, life satisfaction remained relatively stable before increasing to 6.5 in 2022. It has since remained stable, although it is higher than the levels recorded before 2020. Despite many changes in daily life due to COVID-19 in 2020, life satisfaction did not fluctuate considerably, and this pattern has continued since the pandemic.

By gender, both men and women reported a score of 6.4, indicating no gender difference. By age group, those aged 60 and over had the lowest life satisfaction at 6.3, while those under 60 recorded scores between 6.4 and

6.6, indicating only small differences across age groups. Compared with 2023, overall levels remained similar, but life satisfaction increased among those in their 30s and those aged 60 and over, while it declined among those in their 40s. Life satisfaction varies noticeably by income level, with higher household income associated with higher life satisfaction. Those in the low-income group earning less than 1 million




SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey;
NOTE The survey covered people aged 19 to 69 until 2019 and those aged 19 and over from 2020 onwards.



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, ¹Korea Social Integration Survey;

Life satisfaction of OECD countries; Average of 2022–2024



SOURCE SDSN, World Happiness Report 2025

NOTE © This is based on the average values from 2022 to 2024. © This is an evaluation item for life based on average scores on a scale of 0 to 10. © The numeral following each country's name is World Happiness ranking among 147 countries.

KRW per month reported a life satisfaction score of 5.8, while those earning 1–2 million KRW scored 6.2, 0.4 points higher. Among those earning 3 million KRW or more, the score ranged from 6.4 to 6.5. Compared with 2023, however, the gap across income levels narrowed slightly.

There were also noticeable differences across occupations. Professionals and office workers reported the highest life satisfaction at 6.6, whereas those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries scored 6.2, and technical workers scored 6.3. Compared with the previous year, life satisfaction declined slightly among professionals whereas it increased among those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

Compared with 2023, life satisfaction showed either no change or only a 0.1-point change across all groups. However, among those in their 40s, it declined by a relatively larger margin of 0.2 points. Groups with low levels of life satisfaction—those aged 60 and over, those earning less than 1 million KRW, and those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries—recorded increases of 0.1 points, narrowing disparities across age, income, and occupational groups.

Life satisfaction is included in both the OECD's Better Life Index (BLI) and in the UN's World Happiness Report. Both incorporate data from the Gallup World Poll for international comparisons. As some countries are occasionally excluded from the Gallup World Poll, the World Happiness Report presents international comparisons based on three-year averages rather than single-year data.

According to the World Happiness Report, Korea's average life satisfaction score for 2022–2024 was 6.04, 0.46 points below the OECD average of 6.50. Korea was among the lower-ranking OECD countries, with a score similar to Portugal and Colombia. Globally, Korea ranked 58th out of 147 countries. Among OECD countries, only Türkiye, Greece, and Hungary had scores below 6.0. By contrast, Finland recorded the highest score at 7.74, followed by Denmark and Iceland, both of which scored above 7.5. Furthermore, Sweden and the Netherlands also scored above 7.3. All of the top 20 countries were OECD members.

Positive Emotions



DEFINITION How often individuals feel positive emotions (happiness) in daily life
HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 regarding how happy respondents were yesterday

6.8 in 2024, up 0.1 from 2023


As an indicator measuring the emotional aspect of subjective well-being, positive emotions are assessed based on responses to a question asking how happy individuals felt on the previous day, one of the most widely used measures of positive emotions.

In 2024, the positive emotions score, measured on an 11-point scale, increased slightly to 6.8 after remaining stable since 2021. Similar to the trend observed in life satisfaction, positive emotions increased slightly each year from 6.2 in 2014 to 2018, before declining slightly. Since 2021, when the score stood at 6.7, it has remained relatively stable.


By gender, both men and women reported an identical score of 6.8. By age group, those aged 60 and over had the lowest score at 6.6, while those aged under 50 scored 7.0. By household income level, positive emotions increased with income. Among those earning 6 million KRW or more, the score was 7.0, while those earning 3 million KRW or more recorded a score of at least 6.8. By contrast, those earning less than 1 million KRW scored 6.0, 0.8 points below the overall average, while those earning 1–3 million

KRW scored 6.5, which was also relatively low. Compared with 2023, the score declined among those earning less than 1 million KRW, further widening the gap across income levels. By occupation, office workers reported the highest positive emotions score at 7.1, whereas the other occupational groups scored between 6.7 and 6.8, indicating only small differences across occupations.

Compared with 2023, positive emotions showed either no change or only a 0.1-point change across most groups. However, those aged 40 and over and those in all occupational groups except professionals recorded relatively larger increases of 0.2 points or more.



Positive emotions by gender, age group, income & occupation; 2023, 2024



SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, Korea Social Integration Survey

Negative Emotions



DEFINITION How often individuals feel negative emotions (worries, depression, etc.) in daily life
HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 regarding how worried or depressed respondents felt yesterday (Average score for worries + Average score for depression) ÷ 2

3.8 in 2024, up 0.7 from 2023

Negative emotions, an indicator measuring the emotional aspect of subjective well-being alongside positive emotions, are assessed based on how worried and depressed individuals felt on the previous day. Negative and positive emotions are not treated as opposite ends of the same scale but as separate indicators, as they measure different aspects of emotional well-being.

In 2024, the negative emotions score, measured on an 11-point scale based on how worried (4.1) and depressed (3.5) respondents felt on the previous day, stood at 3.8, a 0.7-point higher than in 2023. Negative emotions declined from 2022 to 2023 but rose again in 2024 to a level similar to that recorded during the COVID-19 pandemic.



By gender, there was no noticeable difference in negative emotions. By age group, those aged 60 and over reported the highest score in 2024, at 4.0, while those aged 19–29 reported a relatively low score of 3.6. This indicates that negative emotions tended to increase with age.

By income level, the pattern observed in 2023, in which negative emotions were higher among those with lower household incomes, continued in 2024. Those earning less than 1 million KRW reported a relatively high score of 4.2,

while those earning 5 million KRW or more recorded scores of 3.7 or lower.

By occupation, office workers and clerks reported the lowest score at 3.8, while those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries recorded the highest at 4.3.

Compared with 2023, all groups recorded increases of 0.6 or more. In particular, negative emotions increased by more than 1.0 point among those in professionals and among those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. These increases were at least 1.5 times as large as those recorded in the other groups.



01 Family·Community

Live-alone Elderly Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of people living alone among those aged 65 and over living in private households

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Census」

HOW TO MEASURE (People aged 65 and over living in single-person households ÷ People aged 65 and over living in private households)×100

FREQUENCY Annual

Family Relationship Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their family relationship

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall family relationship

FREQUENCY Biennial

Sense of Belonging to a Community

DEFINITION A proportion of the population with a sense of belonging to the community that they live in

SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very much” or “somewhat” to the question asking whether to have a strong sense of belonging to a community (city/province) that they currently live in

FREQUENCY Annual

Social Group Participation Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the population participating in social group activities

SOURCE Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “sometimes engaging in activities as a member” or “actively engaging in activities as a member” in any of nine social groups* listed below(* A political party, labour union, religious group, club, civic group, local social gathering, voluntary service/donation group, alumni/hometown association or socio-economic organisation)

FREQUENCY Annual

Social Isolation

DEFINITION A proportion of people who don’t have anyone to turn to in case of a physical or mental emergency

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that there was no one to turn to even if they needed someone either to ‘help with housework’ or ‘talk to’

FREQUENCY Biennial

02 Health

Life Expectancy

DEFINITION The average number of years a newborn (age 0) is expected to live

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Life Tables」

HOW TO MEASURE Expected lifespan at birth (age 0)

FREQUENCY Annual

Healthy Life Expectancy

DEFINITION Expected years when a person can physically and mentally enjoy a healthy life excluding a period of disease or disabilities from life expectancy

SOURCE WHO, *World Health Statistics*

HOW TO MEASURE A period excluding the total population’s average period of diseases or disabilities from life expectancy

FREQUENCY Annual

Stress Self-recognition

DEFINITION A proportion of the population feeling stressed in their daily life

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “severely stressed out” or “moderately stressed out” regarding their daily life for the past two weeks

FREQUENCY Biennial

Self-reported Health

DEFINITION A proportion of the population assessing themselves as healthy

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents that replied “very good” or “good” regarding their overall health conditions

FREQUENCY Biennial

Obesity Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the population with BMI (body mass index) of 25 or higher

SOURCE Korea Disease Control & Prevention Agency, 「Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of people with body mass index (BMI) of 25 or higher (BMI = Weight (kg) ÷ [Height (m)]²)

FREQUENCY Annual

Suicide Rate

DEFINITION The number of suicide deaths out of 100,000 population

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Causes of Death Statistics」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of suicide deaths ÷ No. of registered population) × 100,000

FREQUENCY Annual

Physical Activity Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the population practicing physical activities in daily life on a regular basis

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that they “practiced” vigorous exercise (hiking, walking, yoga, cycling, etc.) on a regular basis

FREQUENCY Biennial

03 Education

Preschool Enrollment Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of children enrolling in a preschool or kindergarten out of the population aged 3 to 5

SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook of Education」; Ministry of Health & Welfare, 「Statistics on Childcare Facilities and Users」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」

HOW TO MEASURE {(No. of 3- to 5-year-olds in preschool + No. of 3-to 5-year-olds enrolling in kindergarten) ÷ School-age Population (aged 3 to 5)} × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Degree of Education Cost Burden

DEFINITION A proportion of parents who believe their children’s education expenditures are burdensome relative to their income
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that education expenditures are “very burdensome” or “somewhat burdensome” out of households with students
FREQUENCY Biennial

Perception toward Effects of School Education

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who positively recognize efficiency of school education
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that school education is “very effective” or “somewhat effective” in ‘To prepare for adulthood, a career and employment’
FREQUENCY Biennial

School Life Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of students satisfied with school life
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of middle and high school students who replied that they were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall school life
FREQUENCY Biennial

Employment Rate of College Graduates

DEFINITION A proportion of the employed out of those eligible for employment after graduation of tertiary education institutes
SOURCE Korean Educational Development Institute, 「Statistical Yearbook for Employment」
HOW TO MEASURE (The employed ÷ Those eligible for employment out of graduates of tertiary education institutes) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Population with Tertiary Education

DEFINITION A proportion of graduates from tertiary education institutes out of the population aged 25 to 64
SOURCE OECD, *OECD Education at a Glance, Education attainment of 25-64 year-old(Tertiary)*
HOW TO MEASURE (Graduates from tertiary education institutes ÷ Population aged 25 to 64)×100
FREQUENCY Annual

04 Employment·Wage

Unemployment Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the unemployed out of economically active population
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Economically Active Population Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of the unemployed aged 15 and over ÷ Economically active population aged 15 and over) ×100
FREQUENCY Annual

Employment Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the employed out of the population aged 15 and over
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Economically Active Population Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of the employed aged 15 and over÷ Population aged 15 and over) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Average Monthly Wage

DEFINITION Average monthly wage per wage earner
SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 「Labor Force Survey at Establishments」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Consumer Price Index」
HOW TO MEASURE Average monthly wage(real amount) of permanent employees(regular payment+overtime payment+annual special payment) and of temporary/daily employees(pre-tax)
FREQUENCY Annual

Proportion of Low-paid Workers

DEFINITION A proportion of wage earners who receive less than 2/3 of the monthly median income out of the total wage earners
SOURCE OECD, *Earnings, Incidence of low pay*
HOW TO MEASURE (No. of wage earners receiving less than 2/3 of the monthly median income ÷ Total number of wage earners) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Working Hours

DEFINITION Total working hours per month of wage earners
SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 「Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type」
HOW TO MEASURE Prescribed work hours + Overtime hours worked
FREQUENCY Annual

Job Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their current job out of wage earners
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall working conditions
FREQUENCY Biennial

05 Income·Consumption·Wealth

Gross National Income per Capita

DEFINITION Total sum of income of the people in a nation from participation in production activities during a certain period, divided by the total population
SOURCE Bank of Korea, 「National Accounts」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Consumer Price Index」
HOW TO MEASURE Gross National Income (Consumer Price Index applied) ÷ Total population
FREQUENCY Annual

Equivalised Median Income

DEFINITION A median amount of household income divided by the number of household members

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Consumer Price Index」
HOW TO MEASURE Equivalised disposable income of sample households, divided by the number of household members (Consumer Price Index applied)
FREQUENCY Annual

Income Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their income
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their income, out of the population with income
FREQUENCY Biennial

Consumption Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with their consumption life
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their overall consumption life (consumption for food, clothing and shelter, leisure and hobbies)
FREQUENCY Biennial

Household Net Wealth

DEFINITION Average assets of all households minus the average debts
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Consumer Price Index」
HOW TO MEASURE Average net wealth of all households (real value with the consumer price index applied) = Average assets of all households - Average debts of all households
FREQUENCY Annual

Household Debt Ratio

DEFINITION A ratio of total household debts to disposable household income
SOURCE OECD, *OECD National Accounts at a Glance, Debt of households*
HOW TO MEASURE (Total household debts ÷ Disposable household income) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Relative Poverty Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of the population receiving no more than 50% of the equivalised median income
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions」
HOW TO MEASURE (Population with no more than 50% of the median disposable income ÷ Total population) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

06 Leisure

Ratio of Expenditure on Leisure

DEFINITION A proportion of spending on cultural or leisure activities out of household expenditures
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Household Income and Expenditure Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE (Monthly average of leisure/cultural/information-related expenditures ÷ Monthly average of household expenditures) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Leisure Time

DEFINITION Average daily leisure time, including weekdays and weekends
SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」
HOW TO MEASURE {(Leisure time on weekdays × 5 days) + (Leisure time on weekends × 2 days)} ÷ 7 days
FREQUENCY Annual

Sufficiency of Leisure Time

DEFINITION A proportion of the respondents who perceive their leisure time as sufficient
SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Leisure Activity Research」
HOW TO MEASURE (Sufficiency of leisure time during weekdays + Sufficiency of leisure time during weekends) ÷ 2
FREQUENCY Annual

Participation in Culture, Art and Sport Event

DEFINITION Average number of per-capita participations in cultural, artistic and sports events
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE Average number of people paying a visit to a concert hall, theater, play, musical, dance, movie, museum, art gallery and sports arena
FREQUENCY Biennial

Travel Days per Person

DEFINITION No. of domestic sightseeing travel days per person on an annual basis
SOURCE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 「Korea National Tourism Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE No. of domestic sightseeing travel days (incl. day trips) per person of the population aged 15 and over
FREQUENCY Annual

Leisure Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with current leisure activities
SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their leisure activities out of the surveyed
FREQUENCY Biennial

07 Housing

Home-ownership Rate

DEFINITION A ratio of households living in their own homes out of total households
SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE (Households occupying in owned home ÷ Total general households) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Rent to Income Ratio

DEFINITION A ratio of housing rents to monthly income
SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」
HOW TO MEASURE (Monthly median rent ÷ Monthly median household income) × 100
FREQUENCY Annual

Residential Area per Capita

DEFINITION Residential area per household member

SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE Average of (Residential area of individual household ÷ No. of household members)

FREQUENCY Annual

Dwelling without Basic Facilities

DEFINITION A proportion of households dwelling below the minimum housing standards out of total households

SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE (Number of households dwelling below the minimum housing standards ÷ Total number of households) × 100

FREQUENCY Annual

Commuting Time to Office

DEFINITION Average time required for commuters to get to work from home

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population and Housing Census」

HOW TO MEASURE Average time required to get to work from home out of the population aged 12 and over

FREQUENCY Quinquennial

Housing Environment satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with overall housing environments in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 「Korea Housing Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied that “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with overall housing environments regarding their residential areas

FREQUENCY Annual

08 Environment

Urban Park Area per Capita

DEFINITION Urban park area per citizen

SOURCE Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, LX, 「Statistics of Urban Plan」

HOW TO MEASURE Area of urban parks developed (Designated area-Undeveloped area) ÷ Total population in urban areas

FREQUENCY Annual

Fine dust concentration level(Particulate Matter Concentration, PM2.5)

DEFINITION Measured concentration level of ultrafine dust (PM_{2.5}, dust with a diameter of 2.5μm or less) in the air

SOURCE National Institute of Environmental Research, 「Annual Report of Ambient Air Quality in Korea」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」

HOW TO MEASURE Population-weighted value of annual averages of fine dust concentration levels in 17 cities and provinces

FREQUENCY Annual

Waterworks Supply Rate in Rural Area

DEFINITION A proportion of households actually supplied with waterworks out of households eligible for waterworks supply in rural areas (-Myeon)

SOURCE Ministry of Environment, 「Statistics of Waterworks」

HOW TO MEASURE (Population with waterworks supply in rural areas (-Myeon) ÷ Total population in rural areas (-Myeon)) × 100

FREQUENCY Annual

Air Quality satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with air quality in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding air environments in the region that they currently reside in

FREQUENCY Biennial

Water Quality Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with water quality in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding rivers (water quality) of the region that they currently reside in

FREQUENCY Biennial

Soil Quality Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with soil environments in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding soil in the region that they currently reside in

FREQUENCY Biennial

Noise Level Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with the level of noise pollution in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of the respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding noise/vibration in the region that they currently reside in

FREQUENCY Biennial

Green Environment Satisfaction

DEFINITION A proportion of the population satisfied with green environments in their residential areas

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very good” or “somewhat good” regarding green environments (mountains, parks, etc.) in the region that they currently reside in

FREQUENCY Biennial

Climate Change Recognition

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who are anxious about climate change

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very worried” or “slightly worried” regarding climate change (heatwave, flood, etc.)

FREQUENCY Biennial

09 Safety

Homicide Rate

DEFINITION No. of homicides per 100,000 population

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Causes of Death Statistics」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Resident Registration Central Population」

HOW TO MEASURE {No. of homicides ÷ No. of population registered} ×100,000

FREQUENCY Annual

Crime Victimisation Rate

DEFINITION No. of crime cases collected in a self-reported method over the past year

SOURCE Korean Institute of Criminology, 「National Public Safety Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE {(estimated) No. of crimes committed ÷ Population aged 14 and over} × 100,000

FREQUENCY Biennial

Feeling Safe Walking Alone at Night

DEFINITION A proportion of the population thinking that they are safe while walking during the night

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very safe” or “somewhat safe” when they walk alone at night

FREQUENCY Biennial

Industrial Accident Mortality Rate

DEFINITION No. of deaths due to industrial accidents and/or diseases per 10,000 workers covered by the industrial accident and safety insurance

SOURCE Ministry of Employment and Labor, 「Industrial Accident Statistics」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of deaths due to industrial accidents ÷ No. of workers covered by industrial accident and safety insurance) × 10,000

FREQUENCY Annual

Number of Fire Fatalities

DEFINITION No. of deaths caused by fires each year

SOURCE National Fire Agency, 「Fire Statistical Yearbook」

HOW TO MEASURE No. of deaths calculated based on the annual incidence of fires

FREQUENCY Annual

Road Traffic Accident Fatality Rate

DEFINITION No. of road casualties due to traffic accidents per 100,000 population

SOURCE Korea Road Traffic Authority, 「Traffic Accident Analysis System」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of mortalities due to traffic accidents ÷ Total population) × 100,000

FREQUENCY Annual

Child Mortality Rate from Safety Accidents

DEFINITION No. of deaths due to safety accidents per 100,000 children aged under 15

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Causes of Death Statistics」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Resident Registration Central Population」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of deaths among children aged under 15 due to safety accidents ÷ Registered population aged under 15)×100,000

FREQUENCY Annual

Perception toward Societal Safety

DEFINITION A proportion of the population recognized that the society is safe in general

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “very safe” or “somewhat safe” regarding overall social safety

FREQUENCY Biennial

Child Abuse Rate

DEFINITION Number of child abuse cases confirmed in relation to children population out of the reported cases of child abuse

SOURCE Ministry of Health and Welfare, 「Report on Child Abuse」; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Population Projections」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of cases where children aged under 18 were abused (finally confirmed) ÷ Estimated population aged under 18) × 100,000

FREQUENCY Annual

10 Civic Engagement

Voter Turnout Rate

DEFINITION A proportion of people eligible voters who voted in the presidential election out of the total number of electorates

SOURCE National Election Commission, 「Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections」

HOW TO MEASURE (No. of voters in Presidential Election ÷ No. of electorates in the presidential election) × 100

FREQUENCY Quinquennial

Perception of Political Empowerment

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who believe that they are politically empowered

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE Arithmetic average of proportions of respondents who answered “never agree” or “little agree” to the following statements: ‘people like me cannot have any influence on what the government does’ or ‘the government never agrees to thoughts or opinions of people like me’

FREQUENCY Annual

Institutional Trust

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who place trust in major institutions and systems

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “can place trust very much” or “can place trust a little bit” on 16 organisations*(★ the government, National Assembly, courts, Prosecutor’s Office, police, local governments, military, labour unions, civic organisations, TV broadcasting stations, newspaper companies, education institutions, medical institutes, large conglomerates and financial firms)

FREQUENCY Annual

Corruption Perceptions Index

DEFINITION An index of perception regarding corruption in the public sector including the government

SOURCE Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index

HOW TO MEASURE The corruption perceptions index is measured by the Transparency International on a scale of up to 100 points. The higher the scores, the lower the perceived level of corruption.

FREQUENCY Annual

DEFINITION Degree of perception toward importance of citizenship

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE Arithmetic average of scores that respondents assigned to the 8 items of importance related to citizens' obligations

FREQUENCY Annual

DEFINITION A proportion of the population participating in voluntary activities

SOURCE Ministry of Data and Statistics, 「Social Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of people who participated in voluntary activities over the past year

FREQUENCY Biennial

DEFINITION A proportion of the population who trust others

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE A proportion of respondents who replied “can trust a little bit” or “can trust very much” to the question to what degree they can trust others

FREQUENCY Annual

DEFINITION Subjective satisfaction in general with individuals' current life

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses regarding satisfaction with the current life on a scale of 0 to 10

FREQUENCY Annual

DEFINITION How often individuals feel positive emotions (happiness) in daily life

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, "Korea Social Integration Survey,"

HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 regarding how happy respondents were yesterday

FREQUENCY Annual

DEFINITION How often individuals feel negative emotions (worries, depressions, etc.) in daily life

SOURCE The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 「Korea Social Integration Survey」

HOW TO MEASURE Average value of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 regarding how worried or depressed respondents felt yesterday (Average score for worries + Average score for depression) ÷ 2

FREQUENCY Annual



Quality of Life Indicators in Korea 2025

AUTHORS

Jieun Lee, Deputy Director of Data and Statistics Research Institute, Ministry of Data and Statistics
Sujin Shim, Deputy Director of Survey Management Bureau, Ministry of Data and Statistics
Eunah Kim, Manager of Data and Statistics Research Institute, Ministry of Data and Statistics

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7F Statistical Center, 713 Hanbat-ro, Seo-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea

CONTACT

water01971@korea.kr, eun0437@korea.kr

DESIGN BY

Donggeuran Book, eumeumeum20@gmail.com

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